Concerning some objections to
the Church’s teaching on the reception of Holy Communion by divorced and
remarried members of the faithful
In 1998 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger,
Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, introduced the
volume: “On the Pastoral Care of the Divorced and Remarried”, published by the
Libreria Editrice Vaticana in the dicastery’s series “Documenti e Studi”, 17.
Because of its interest in our day and its breadth of perspective, we reproduce
the third part along with three additional notes. This text is also available
on the newspaper’s website (www.osservatoreromano.va) in English, Italian,
French, German, Portuguese and Spanish.
The Letter of the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith of 14 September 1994 concerning the reception of Holy
Communion by divorced and remarried members of the faithful was met with a very
lively response across wide sections of the Church. Along with many positive
reactions, more than a few critical voices were also heard. The fundamental
objections against the teaching and practice of the Church are outlined below
in simplified form.
Several of
the more significant objections — principally, the reference to the supposedly
more flexible practice of the Church Fathers which would be the inspiration for
the practice of the Eastern Churches separated from Rome, as well as the
allusion to the traditional principles of epicheia and of aequitas
canonica — were
studied in-depth by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Articles by
Professors Pelland, Marcuzzi and Rodriguez Luño (1), among others, were
developed in the course of this study. The main conclusions of the research,
which suggest the direction of an answer to the objections, will be briefly
summarized here.
1. Some maintain that several
passages of the New Testament suggest that the words of Jesus on the
indissolubility of marriage allow for a flexible application and cannot be
classified in a strictly legal sense.
Several exegetes point out
critically that with regard to the indissolubility of marriage, the Magisterium
cites almost exclusively one pericope — namely, Mk. 10:11-12 — and does not
sufficiently take into account other passages from the Gospel of Matthew and
the First Letter to Corinthians. They claim that these biblical passages speak
of a certain exception to the Lord’s words about the indissolubility of
marriage, notably in the case of porneia (Mt 5:32; 19:9) and in the case of
separation because of the faith (1 Cor 7:12-16). They hold that these texts
should be an indication that, already in apostolic times, Christians in
difficult situations had known a flexible application of the words of Jesus.
In replying to this objection, one
notes that magisterial documents do not intend to present the biblical
foundations of the teachings on marriage in a complete and exhaustive way. They
entrust this important task to competent experts. The Magisterium emphasizes,
however, that the teaching of the Church on the indissolubility of marriage is
faithful to the words of Jesus. Jesus clearly identifies the Old Testament
practice of divorce as a consequence of the hardness of the human heart. He refers
— over and above the law — to the beginning of creation, to the will of the
Creator, and summarizes his teaching with the words: “Therefore what God has
joined together, no human being must separate” (Mk 10:9). With the coming of
the Redeemer, marriage is therefore restored to its original form intended at
creation and is wrested away from human arbitrariness — above all from the whim
of the husband, since for wives there really was no possibility of divorce.
Jesus’ words on the indissolubility of marriage overcome the old order of the
law with the new order of faith and grace. Only in this way can marriage fully
become a God-given vocation to love and human dignity and the sign of the
unconditional covenant of divine love, i.e., a sacrament (cf. Eph 5:32).
The possibility of separation, which
Paul discusses in 1 Cor. 7, regards marriage between a Christian and a
non-baptized person. Later theological reflection has clarified that only
marriages between baptized persons are a sacrament in the strict sense of the
word, and that absolute indissolubility holds only for those marriages falling
within the scope of Christian faith. So-called “natural marriage” has its
dignity from the order of creation and is therefore oriented toward
indissolubility, but it can be dissolved under certain circumstances because of
a higher good — which in this case is faith. This is how systematic theology
correctly classified St Paul
Extensive literature exists
regarding the correct understanding of the porneia clauses, with many differing
and even conflicting hypotheses. There is no unanimity among exegetes on this
point. Many maintain that it refers to invalid marital unions, not to an
exception to the indissolubility of marriage. In any case, the Church cannot
construct her doctrine and praxis on uncertain exegetical hypotheses. She must
adhere to the clear teaching of Christ.
2. Others object that the patristic
tradition leaves room for a more varied praxis, which would be more equitable
in difficult situations; furthermore, the Catholic Church could learn from the
principle of “economy” employed by Eastern Churches separated from Rome
It is claimed that the current
Magisterium relies on only one strand of the patristic tradition, and not on
the whole legacy of the ancient Church. Although the Fathers clearly held fast
to the doctrinal principle of the indissolubility of marriage, some of them
tolerated a certain flexibility on the pastoral level with regard to difficult
individual cases. On this basis Eastern Churches separated from Rome later
developed alongside the principle of akribia, fidelity to revealed
truth, that of oikonomia, benevolent
leniency in difficult situations. Without renouncing the doctrine of the
indissolubility of marriage, in some cases they permit a second and even a
third marriage, which is distinct, however, from the sacramental first marriage
and is marked by a penitential character. Some say that this practice has never
been explicitly condemned by the Catholic Church. They claim that the 1980
Synod of Bishops proposed to study this tradition thoroughly, in order to allow
the mercy of God to be more resplendent.
Father Pelland’s study points out
the direction in which the answers to these questions can be sought. Naturally,
for the interpretation of individual patristic texts, the work of historians is
necessary. Because of the difficult textual issues involved, controversies will
not be lacking in the future. Theologically, one must affirm the following:
a. There exists a clear consensus
among the Fathers regarding the indissolubility of marriage. Since it derives
from the will of the Lord, the Church has no authority over it. For this
reason, from the outset Christian marriage was distinct from marriage in Roman society,
even though in the first centuries there did not yet exist any canonical
system. The Church in the time of the Fathers clearly excluded divorce and
remarriage, precisely out of faithful obedience to the New Testament.
b. In the Church at the time of the
Fathers, divorced and remarried members of the faithful were never officially
admitted to Holy Communion after a time of penance. It is true, however, that
the Church did not always rigorously revoke concessions in certain territories,
even when they were identified as not in agreement with her doctrine and
discipline. It also seems true that individual Fathers, Leo the Great being
among them, sought pastoral solutions for rare borderline cases.
c. This led to two opposing
developments:
— In the Imperial
Church after Constantine Rome
— In the West, on account of the
Gregorian reform, the original concept of the Church Fathers was recovered.
This development came to its conclusion at the Council of Trent and was once
again expressed as a doctrine of the Church at the Second Vatican Council.
On doctrinal grounds, the praxis of
the Eastern Churches separated from Rome cannot be taken up by the Catholic
Church, as it is the result of a complex historical process, an increasingly
liberal — and thus more and more removed from the words of
the Lord — interpretation of several obscure patristic texts which were significantly
influenced by civil law. Furthermore, the claim is incorrect that the Church
simply tolerated such a praxis. Admittedly, the Council of Trent did not
pronounce any explicit condemnation. The medieval canonists, however,
consistently spoke of the praxis as improper. Furthermore, there is evidence
that groups of Orthodox believers who became Catholic had to sign a profession
of faith with an explicit reference to the impossibility of a second marriage.
3. Many propose to allow exceptions
to the Church’s norm on the basis of the traditional principles of epikeia and aequitas
canonica.
Certain marriage cases, it is said,
cannot be handled in the external forum. Some claim that the Church should not
simply rely on juridical norms, but on the contrary ought to respect and
tolerate the conscience of the individual. They say that theological notions of epikeia andaequitas canonica could serve to justify, from moral
theology as well as juridically, a decision of conscience at variance from the
general norm. Especially regarding the question of receiving the sacraments,
they claim that the Church should take some steps forward and not just issue
prohibitions to the faithful.
The contributions made by Professor
Marcuzzi and Professor Rodríguez Luño throw light on his complex problem. To
this end, there are three areas of inquiry which clearly need to be
distinguished from each other:
a. Epikeia and aequitas canonica exist in the sphere of human and
purely ecclesiastical norms of great significance, but cannot be applied to
those norms over which the Church has no discretionary authority. The
indissoluble nature of marriage is one of these norms which goes back to Christ
Himself and is thus identified as a norm of divine law. The Church cannot
sanction pastoral practices — for example, sacramental pastoral practices -
which contradict the clear instruction of the Lord.
In other words, if the prior
marriage of two divorced and remarried members of the faithful was valid, under
no circumstances can their new union be considered lawful and therefore
reception of the sacraments is intrinsically impossible. The conscience of the
individual is bound to this norm without exception. (2)
b. However the Church has the
authority to clarify those conditions which must be fulfilled for a marriage to
be considered indissoluble according to the sense of Jesus’ teaching. In line
with the Pauline assertion in 1 Cor. 7, she established that only two baptized
Christians can enter into a sacramental marriage. She developed the legal concept
of the Pauline privilege and the Petrine privilege. With reference to the porneia clauses in Matthew and in Acts 15:20,
the impediments to marriage were established. Furthermore, grounds for the
nullity of marriage were identified with ever greater clarity, and the
procedural system was developed in greater detail. All of this contributed to
delineating and articulating more precisely the concept of the indissolubility
of marriage. One can say that, in this way, the Western Church
Since marriage has a fundamental
public ecclesial character and the axiom applies that nemo
iudex in propria causa (no
one is judge in his own case), marital cases must be resolved in the external
forum. If divorced and remarried members of the faithful believe that their
prior marriage was invalid, they are thereby obligated to appeal to the
competent marriage tribunal so that the question will be examined objectively
and under all available juridical possibilities.
c. Admittedly, it cannot be excluded
that mistakes occur in marriage cases. In some parts of the Church,
well-functioning marriage tribunals still do not exist. Occasionally, such
cases last an excessive amount of time. Once in a while they conclude with
questionable decisions. Here it seems that the application of epikeia in the internal forum is not
automatically excluded from the outset. This is implied in the 1994 letter of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in which it was stated that new
canonical ways of demonstrating nullity should exclude “as far as possible”
every divergence from the truth verifiable in the judicial process (cf. n. 9).
Some theologians are of the opinion that the faithful ought to adhere strictly
even in the internal forum to juridical decisions which they believe to be
false. Others maintain that exceptions are possible here in the internal forum,
because the juridical forum does not deal with norms of divine law, but rather
with norms of ecclesiastical law. This question, however, demands further study
and clarification. Admittedly, the conditions for asserting an exception would
need to be clarified very precisely, in order to avoid arbitrariness and to
safeguard the public character of marriage, removing it from subjective
decisions.
4. Some accuse the current
Magisterium of reversing the doctrinal development of the Council and of
substituting a pre-conciliar view of marriage.
Some theologians claim that at the
new magisterial documents having to do with questions of marriage are based on
a naturalistic, legalistic concept of marriage. Attention is given to the
contract between the spouses and to the ius in corpus. It is claimed that the Council
overturned this static understanding and described marriage in a more
personalistic way as a covenant of love and life. Thus it would have opened up
possibilities for resolving difficult situations more humanely. Thinking
further along this line, some scholars pose the question of whether or not one
could speak of the death of the marriage, if the personal bond of love between
the spouses no longer exists. Others resurrect the old question of whether or
not the Pope would have the capability of dissolving marriage in such cases.
Yet anyone who attentively reads the
more recent statements of the Church will note that their central assertions
are based on Gaudium et spes and that they further develop the
teaching contained therein in a thoroughly personalist line, in the direction
indicated by the Council. However, it is inappropriate to set up a
contradiction between the personalist and juridical views of marriage. The
Council did not break with the traditional concept of marriage, but on the
contrary developed it further. When, for example, it is continually pointed out
that the Council substituted the broader and theologically more profound
concept of covenant for the strictly legal concept of contract, one must not forget
that within covenant, the element of contract is also contained and indeed
placed within a broader perspective. The fact that marriage reaches well beyond
the purely juridical realm into the depths of humanity and into the mystery of
the divine, has always been indicated by the word “sacrament”, although often
it has not been pondered with the same clarity which the Council gave to these
aspects. Law is not everything, but it is an indispensable part, one dimension
of the whole. Marriage without a juridical dimension which integrates it into
the whole fabric of society and the Church simply does not exist. If the
post-Conciliar revision of canon law included the realm of marriage, this is
not a betrayal of the Council, but the implementation of its mandate.
If the Church were to accept the
theory that a marriage is dead when the two spouses no longer love one another,
then she would thereby sanction divorce and would uphold the indissolubility of
marriage only in word, and no longer in fact. Therefore, the opinion that the
Pope could potentially dissolve a consummated sacramental marriage, which has
been irrevocably broken, must be considered erroneous. Such a marriage cannot
be dissolved by anyone. At their wedding, the spouses promise to be faithful to
each other until death.
Further study is required, however,
concerning the question of whether non-believing Christians — baptized persons
who never or who no longer believe in God — can truly enter into a sacramental
marriage. In other words, it needs to be clarified whether every marriage
between two baptized persons is ipso facto a sacramental marriage. In fact, the
Code states that only a “valid” marriage between baptized persons is at the
same time a sacrament (cf. cic, can. 1055, § 2). Faith belongs to the essence
of the sacrament; what remains to be clarified is the juridical question of
what evidence of the “absence of faith” would have as a consequence that the
sacrament does not come into being. (3)
5. Many argue that the position of
the Church on the question of divorced and remarried faithful is overly
legalistic and not pastoral.
A series of critical objections
against the doctrine and praxis of the Church pertain to questions of a
pastoral nature. Some say, for example, that the language used in the ecclesial
documents is too legalistic, that the rigidity of law prevails over an
understanding of dramatic human situations. They claim that the human person of
today is no longer able to understand
such language, that Jesus would have had an open ear for the needs of people,
particularly for those on the margins of society. They say that the Church, on
the other hand, presents herself like a judge who excludes wounded people from
the sacraments and from certain public responsibilities.
One can readily admit that the
Magisterium’s manner of expression does not seem very easy to understand at
times. It needs to be translated by preachers and catechists into a language
which relates to people and to their respective cultural environments. The
essential content of the Church’s teaching, however, must be upheld in this
process. It must not be watered down on allegedly pastoral grounds, because it
communicates the revealed truth.
Certainly, it is difficult to make
the demands of the Gospel understandable to secularized people. But this
pastoral difficulty must not lead to compromises with the truth. In his
Encyclical Veritatis splendor, John Paul
II clearly rejected so-called pastoral solutions which stand in opposition to
the statements of the Magisterium (cf. ibid. 56).
Furthermore, concerning the position
of the Magisterium as regards the question of divorced and remarried members of
the faithful, it must be stressed that the more recent documents of the Church
bring together the demands of truth with those of love in a very balanced way.
If at times in the past, love shone forth too little in the explanation of the
truth, so today the danger is great that in the name of love, truth is either
to be silenced or compromised. Assuredly, the word of truth can be painful and
uncomfortable. But it is the way to holiness, to peace, and to inner freedom. A
pastoral approach which truly wants to help the people concerned must always be
grounded in the truth. In the end, only the truth can be pastoral. “Then you
will know the truth, and the truth will set you free” (Jn 8:32).
Notes
1 Cf. Angel Rodríguez Luño, L’epicheia
nella cura pastorale dei fedeli divorziati risposati, ibid.,
pp. 75-87; Piero Giorgio Marcuzzi, sdb, Applicazione di “aequitas et epikeia” ai
contenuti della Lettera della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede del 14
settembre 1994, ibid., pp. 88-98; Gilles
Pelland, sj, La pratica della Chiesa antica relativa
ai fedeli divorziati risposati, ibid., pp. 99-131.2
2 On this matter the norm referred
to by John Paul II in his Apostolic Letter Familiaris Consortio, n. 84,
is quite valuable: “Reconciliation in the sacrament of Penance which would open
the way to the Eucharist, can only be granted to those who, repenting of having
broken the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ, are sincerely ready
to undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the
indissolubility of marriage. This means, in practice, that when, for serious
reasons, such as for example the children’s upbringing, a man and a woman
cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they ‘take on themselves the duty to
live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to
married couples’”. See also the Apostolic Letter of Benedict XVI, Sacramentum
Caritatis, n. 29.
3 During the meeting with clergy in
the Diocese of Aosta, which took place 25 July 2005, Pope Benedict XVI spoke of
this difficult question: “those who were married in the Church for the sake of
tradition but were not truly believers, and who later find themselves in a new
and invalid marriage and subsequently convert, discover faith and feel excluded
from the Sacrament, are in a particularly painful situation. This really is a
cause of great suffering and when I was Prefect of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, I invited various Bishops’ Conferences and experts to
study this problem: a sacrament celebrated without faith. Whether, in fact, a
moment of invalidity could be discovered here because the Sacrament was found
to be lacking a fundamental dimension, I do not dare to say. I personally
thought so, but from the discussions we had I realized that it is a highly
complex problem and ought to be studied further. But given these people’s
painful plight, it must be studied further”.
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