Sunday, June 27, 2010

St. Cyril of Alexandria: Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople III

Today is the feast of St. Cyril of Alexandria. Cyril did the great thing of insisting on the ontological reality of the Person of Jesus Christ as Son of God. He effectively distinguished between person and nature as objects of concepts. His theology was the key to the “almost” definitive theology of Chalcedon which proclaimed formally that in Christ there is one Person and two natures: divine and human.

But he failed to explain how the human will in Christ could be the will of God and still free with the freedom of choice. The fathers of Chalcedon took all of the thought of Cyril but without answering that conundrum. 230 years of theological and political confusion followed. The reigning heresy that emerged was the reduction of the will of Christ to only one will, not two. This was obviously problematic since it would mean that Christ was not fully God and man, and therefore the full freight of humanity would not have been assumed by the Word, and therefore, not redeemed. The one willed heresy of Christ was “monothelitism.”

Benedict XVI wrote on 6/25/2008: “St. Maximus understood immediately that this would have destroyed the mystery of salvation, because a humanity without will – a man without a will – is not a true man, but rather an amputated man. Therefore, the man Jesus Christ would not have been a true man, would not have experienced the drama of the human being, which consists precisely in the difficulty of conforming our will with the truth of being….

Sacred Scripture does not show us an amputated man, without a will, but a true complete man: God, in Jesus Christ, has truly assumed the totality of the human being – obviously except for sin - hence also, a human will.”

Maximus saw that human freedom does not consist in the choice to say No to the will of the Father. “The greatest liberty is to say ‘yes,’ to conform with the will of God. Only in saying ‘yes’ does man really become himself. Only in the great opening of the ‘yes,’ in the unification of his will with the divine will, does man become immensely open, he becomes ‘divine.’”

Maximus saw that it is not the will that wills, but the person that wills. Hence, the divine Person wills with a divine will, and with a human will. But it is He who wills with two ontological distinct wills (created and uncreated). Therefore, they are one personal will.

Again, the key is understanding the Person to be a subject, a single “I” who emotes as “yes” to the Father rendering both wills to be one.

This is a real development of doctrine that is the completion of the doctrine of Chalcedon that left us with the parallelism of the two natures, the two wills, and with that, the dualism of supernatural/natural, grace/nature, faith/reason, Church/State, minister/layfaithful, etc. The solution to those problem/mysteries that haunt us today is in the completion of Cyril by Maximus. Read further….

Musings on These Feast Days of Opus Dei

Apropos of These Feasts of Opus Dei

Revelation Takes Place in History

Absolute everything on this blog responds to one idea: that "to be" is constitutively relational. The point below is the same: sanctity is not the development of a substance as "thing-in-itself". Sanctity is intrinsically relational, and therefore the result of self-gift to the Revealer, the Person of Christ.

We are not called to a detached mysticism as Eve going off to the East. Notice that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses, Peter, James John, etc. are not great mystical figures like Gandhi, the Buddha, Lao-tzu. We are receptors of the Holy Spirit whereby we become Christ in the flesh via the small thing. Then-Joseph Ratzinger wrote: “God seeks out man in the midst of this worldly and earthly connections and relationships; God, whom no one, not even the purest of men, can discover for himself, comes to man of his own volition and enters into relationship with him….It is not primarily the discovery of some truth; rather it is the activity of God himself making history. Its meaning is, not that divine reality becomes visible to man, but that it makes the person who receives the revelation into an actor in divine history. For here, in contrast to mysticism, God is the one who acts, and it is he who brings salvation to man.” Danielou says: “Those who are saved are the inward-looking souls, whatever the religion they profess. For Christianity, they are the believers, whatever level of inwardness they may have achieved. A little child, an overworked workman, if they believe, stand at a higher level than the greatest ascetics. ‘We are not great religious personalities,’ Guardini once said; ‘we are servants of the Word.’ Christ himself had said that Saint John the Baptist might well be ‘the greatest among the children of men,’ but that ‘the least among the sons of the kingdom is greater than he’ (see Lk. 7, 28). It is possible for there to be great religious personalities in the world even outside of Christianity; it is indeed very possible for the greatest religious personalities to be found outside Christianity; but that means nothing; what counts is obedience to the Word of Christ.”[1] [2]

We are not called to a transcendent, mystical life in solitude whereby we might be great religious figures. By Baptism, we are called to be another God-Incarnate in the humdrum and quotidian affairs of secular life. Can you image hearing the risen Christ say “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting me?” The “Me” are the Christians of Damascus.

[1] Danielou, Vom Geheimnis der Geschichte (On the Mystery of History), pp. 133 f.

[2] J. Ratzinger, “Truth and Tolerance,” Ignatius (2004) 42-43.

Thursday, June 24, 2010

John the Baptist - Thomas More

Both spoke the Word of Christ. Both were beheaded (and worse). We must also speak the Word and suffer the slings and arrows of whatever misfortune may come our way.

John the Baptist:

So he began saying to the crowds who were going out to be baptized by him, "You brood of vipers, who warned you to flee from the wrath to come? Bring forth therefore fruits befitting repentance and do not begin to say, ‘We have Abraham for our father; for I say to you that God is able out of these stones to raise up children to Abraham. For even now the axe is laid at the root of the trees; every tree, therefore, that is not bringing forth fruit is to be cut down and thrown into the fire” (Lk. 3, 7-9).

“He will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire. His winnowing fan is in his hand, and he will clean out his threshing floor and will gather the wheat into his barn; but the chaff he will burn up with unquenchable fire.’ So with many different exhortations he kept on preaching the gospel to the people.

“For Herod the tetrarch, being reproved by him concerning Herodias, his brother’s wife, and concerning all the evil things that Herod had done, crowned all this by shutting up John in prison” (Lk. 3, 17-20).

“The next day John saw Jesus coming to him, and he said, ‘Behold, the lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world! This is he of whom I said, ‘After me there comes one who has been set above me, because he was before me.’ And I did not know him. But that he may be known in Israel, for this reason Have I come baptizing with water.

“And John bore witness, saying, ‘I beheld the Spirit descending as a dove from heaven, and it abode upon him.’ And I did not know him. But he who sent me to baptize with water said to me, He upon whom thou wilt see the Spirit descending, and abiding upon him, he it is who baptizes with the Holy Spirit.’ And I have seen and have borne witness that this is the Son of God’”(Jn. 1, 29-34).

“Again, the next day John was standing there, and two of his disciples. And looking upon Jesus as he walked by, he said, ‘Behold the lamb of God!’ And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus” (Jn. 1, 35-37).

St. Thomas More:

In the Tower:

Roper: Sir, come out! Swear to the Act! Take the oath and come out!

More: Is this why they let you come?

Roper: Yes… Meg’s under oath to persuade you.

More: That was silly, Meg. How did you come to do that?

Margaret: I wanted to! [me: love is the best of reasons]

More: You want me to swear to the Act of Succession?

Margaret: “God more regards the thoughts of the heart than the words of the mouth.” Or so you’ve always told me.

More: Yes.

Margaret: Then say the words of the oath and in your heart think otherwise.

More: What is an oath then but words we say to God?

Margaret: That’s very neat.

More: Do you mean it isn’t true?

Margaret: No, it’s true.

More: Then it’s a poor argument to call it ‘neat,’ Meg. When a man takes an oath, Meg, he’s holding his own self in his own hands. Like water. [He cups his hands] And if he opens his fingers then – he needn’t hope to find himself again. Some men aren’t capable of this, but I’d be loathe to think your father one of them.

Margaret: In any State that was half good, you would be raised up high, not here, for what you’ve done already. It’s not your fault the State’s three-quarters bad. Then if you elect to suffer for it, you elect yourself a hero.

More: That’s very neat. But look now … If we lived in a State where virtue was profitable, common sense would make us good, and greed would make us saintly. And we’d live like animals or angels in the happy land that needs no heroes. But since in fact we see that avarice, anger, envy, pride, sloth, lust and stupidity commonly profit far beyond humility, chastity, fortitude, justice and thought, and have to choose, to be human at all… why then perhaps we must stand fast a little – even at the risk of being heroes.

Margaret: [Emotionally] But in reason! Haven’t you done as much s God can reasonable want?

More: Well… finally… it isn’t a matter of reason; finally it’s a matter of love.”

Wednesday, June 23, 2010

Hooked on Gadgets, And Paying a Mental Price

SAN FRANCISCO — When one of the most important e-mail messages of his life landed in his in-box a few years ago, Kord Campbell overlooked it.

· Not just for a day or two, but 12 days. He finally saw it while sifting through old messages: a big company wanted to buy his Internet start-up.

“I stood up from my desk and said, ‘Oh my God, oh my God, oh my God,’ ” Mr. Campbell said. “It’s kind of hard to miss an e-mail like that, but I did.”

The message had slipped by him amid an electronic flood: two computer screens alive with e-mail, instant messages, online chats, a Web browser and the computer code he was writing. (View an interactive panorama of Mr. Campbell's workstation.)

While he managed to salvage the $1.3 million deal after apologizing to his suitor, Mr. Campbell continues to struggle with the effects of the deluge of data. Even after he unplugs, he craves the stimulation he gets from his electronic gadgets. He forgets things like dinner plans, and he has trouble focusing on his family.

His wife, Brenda, complains, “It seems like he can no longer be fully in the moment.”

This is your brain on computers.

Scientists say juggling e-mail, phone calls and other incoming information can change how people think and behave. They say our ability to focus is being undermined by bursts of information.

These play to a primitive impulse to respond to immediate opportunities and threats. The stimulation provokes excitement — a dopamine squirt — that researchers say can be addictive. In its absence, people feel bored.

The resulting distractions can have deadly consequences, as when cellphone-wielding drivers and train engineers cause wrecks. And for millions of people like Mr. Campbell, these urges can inflict nicks and cuts on creativity and deep thought, interrupting work and family life.

While many people say multitasking makes them more productive, research shows otherwise. Heavy multitaskers actually have more trouble focusing and shutting out irrelevant information, scientists say, and they experience more stress.

And scientists are discovering that even after the multitasking ends, fractured thinking and lack of focus persist. In other words, this is also your brain off computers.

“The technology is rewiring our brains,” said Nora Volkow, director of the National Institute of Drug Abuse and one of the world’s leading brain scientists. She and other researchers compare the lure of digital stimulation less to that of drugs and alcohol than to food and sex, which are essential but counterproductive in excess.

Technology use can benefit the brain in some ways, researchers say. Imaging studies show the brains of Internet users become more efficient at finding information. And players of some video games develop better visual acuity.

More broadly, cellphones and computers have transformed life. They let people escape their cubicles and work anywhere. They shrink distances and handle countless mundane tasks, freeing up time for more exciting pursuits.

For better or worse, the consumption of media, as varied as e-mail and TV, has exploded. In 2008, people consumed three times as much information each day as they did in 1960. And they are constantly shifting their attention. Computer users at work change windows or check e-mail or other programs nearly 37 times an hour, new research shows.

The nonstop interactivity is one of the most significant shifts ever in the human environment, said Adam Gazzaley, a neuroscientist at the University of California, San Francisco.

“We are exposing our brains to an environment and asking them to do things we weren’t necessarily evolved to do,” he said. “We know already there are consequences.”

Mr. Campbell, 43, came of age with the personal computer, and he is a heavier user of technology than most. But researchers say the habits and struggles of Mr. Campbell and his family typify what many experience — and what many more will, if trends continue.

For him, the tensions feel increasingly acute, and the effects harder to shake.

The Campbells recently moved to California from Oklahoma to start a software venture. Mr. Campbell’s life revolves around computers. (View a slide show on how the Campbells interact with technology.)

He goes to sleep with a laptop or iPhone on his chest, and when he wakes, he goes online. He and Mrs. Campbell, 39, head to the tidy kitchen in their four-bedroom hillside rental in Orinda, an affluent suburb of San Francisco, where she makes breakfast and watches a TV news feed in the corner of the computer screen while he uses the rest of the monitor to check his e-mail.

Major spats have arisen because Mr. Campbell escapes into video games during tough emotional stretches. On family vacations, he has trouble putting down his devices. When he rides the subway to San Francisco, he knows he will be offline 221 seconds as the train goes through a tunnel.

Their 16-year-old son, Connor, tall and polite like his father, recently received his first C’s, which his family blames on distraction from his gadgets. Their 8-year-old daughter, Lily, like her mother, playfully tells her father that he favors technology over family.

Apropos A Workshop on Matrimony

Development of Primary and Secondary Ends of Marriage into The Good of the Spouses Who, as Self Gift, are Constitutively Open to Procreation
Marriage, Annulment, and the Quest for Lasting Commitment

Msgr. Cormac Burke (The Catholic World Report, January 1966, 54-61
Anonymous writings do not appeal to me, since I feel that each one should have the 
courage of his convictions. So while Polonaise involves me in his animadversions, I 
would probably have let that pass. But since he also misrepresents the teaching of the 
magisterium (partly by ignoring it), I think your readers are entitled to some comments 
which hopefully can clarify some important points.
 A preliminary remark however seems called for. Polonaise chose to write his article 
anonymously "in order to avoid giving offense to parishioners who have, in good 
conscience, sought and received annulments." Is he implying that all those who have 
had their marriages declared null should  be in good conscience? Or that 
declarations of nullity are a bad thing in themselves? As an ecclesiastical judge, I cannot 
accept this, among other reasons because many of the declarations of annulment I have 
had to review at the Rota have seemed to me perfectly just and rightly given. It may 
well be that we have more declarations of nullity than are justified, or too many 
nullities declared just on one particular grounds (consensual incapacity); but these are 
questions which could only be answered by examining each case on an individual 
 Polonaise seems to limit his concern to one point: there are too many declarations of 
nullity, and the number must be reduced. To my mind, he is missing the real 
underlying problem, which is not the number of declarations of nullity but the number 
of failed marriages. Not all failed marriages are entitled to be declared null; but it is 
fairly evident that if we can reduce the number of marital failures, we are going to have 
less petitions for nullity. I wish Polonaise had sought to investigate the roots of these 
failures, instead of putting the blame for the problem he sees on the new Code of 
Canon law. For this is in effect what he does.
 In the last analysis, he says, "There is a problem with the law itself, a problem with the 
new Code." And he pinpoints this problem: it "has to do with the definition of marriage 
and the object of consent in the new Code." It is peculiar that, having echoed the Pope's 
plea for a sound anthropology in our approach to marriage, he chooses to criticize in 
particular the two canons which, to my mind, best reflect the Christian anthropology 
and personalism characterizing the teaching on marriage of the present Pope as well as 
that of Vatican II: a teaching which, if properly understood and properly applied in 
pastoral and canonical work, can powerfully facilitate the renewal of married life. If it 
is not properly understood (as I think Polonaise has not understood it), or properly 
applied (as perhaps happens in some pastoral areas), then certainly the results can be 
 Polonaise seems clearly convinced that the explosion of annulments is mainly the 
result of the abandoning of the concept of the hierarchy of the ends of marriage; that is, 
the teaching embodied in 1013 of the Code of Canon Law of 1917, that marriage has a 
"primary" end (procreation and education of offspring) and two "secondary" ends 
(mutual aid and the remedy of concupiscence). "The denial of this hierarchy of ends 
opens the door to the flood of annulments we see today." I happen not to agree with 
this view, but do not question Polonaise's right to hold or present it. What I do question 
is  denial that there has been a change (or a , as I hold) in the 
Church's teaching on the ends of marriage.
 Here he involves me rather heavily. I would not be bothered at this, except that I feel 
he is utterly misleading your readers about the true position of current magisterium on 
the point. Polonaise correctly interprets me when he states, "There is little doubt that 
Cormac Burke now accepts that the Church today defines marriage with two equal and 
interrelated primary ends." This is true. However, if he had quoted one passage from 
my article in the March 1995 issue of the , I think he 
would have reflected more justly not only my opinion, but also why I hold it to be 
grounded in the magisterium. I wrote:
For long in Catholic teaching a hierarchical presentation was made of the ends of 
marriage, with procreation being the principal end. Vatican II, which twice emphasizes 
that marriage is of its nature ordered to procreation, does not use the term "primary" 
end. In two major documents of the post-conciliar magisterium a clear and integrated 
view of the ends of marriage has been articulated. The 
Church> declares that these ends are twofold: "the good spouses themselves, and the 
transmission of life," which is identical to what was already stated in the 1983 
Canon Law> .... Rather than any hierarchy between them, it is their mutual 
interdependence and inseparability which are now emphasized.
 As I said above, I consider the new emphasis here to be a  from the 
teaching of Pius XI and Pius XII. If Polonaise chooses to see a contradiction rather than 
a development, he should not mislead your readers by claiming that nothing has 
happened in magisterial teaching at this point. In support of his claim, all he can 
adduce from the last 35 years is a single reference, made in parenthesis and in passing, 
in a Wednesday address of Pope John Paul II in 1984. He admits that Vatican II makes 
no mention of any hierarchy. He fails to mention that neither does 
Consortio>. He apparently either does not regard the 1983 Code of Canon Law as a 
magisterial document (John Paul II refers to it as "the last document of the Council"), or 
attaches no importance to its clear statement of two ends standing equally together: 
marriage "is by it nature ordered to the good of the spouses and to the procreation and 
education of offspring" (1055)[1]. But where he most misleads readers who wish to 
achieve an objective view of this question is by his total omission of any reference to the 
new<>, silencing completely the passages which I quote in the 
Pastoral Review>. 
 When Polonaise writes: "However, there is no need for anyone to defend the 
orthodoxy of the [new] Code," one gets the feeling he is perhaps trying to calm his own 
misgivings. I trust he does not so doubt the orthodoxy of the new  as not 
to quote it.
 Polonaise evidently dislikes the expression , or "good of the 
spouses," and suggests that if it has any meaning, it can only be found within the 
notion of the hierarchy of the ends, and that of the "." Having failed to 
understand the meaning of the term ""--having in fact got its 
meaning wrong--he of course cannot see its richness or the importance of the horizons 
for renewal that it opens up.
 That this failure of understanding here is radical becomes apparent when he objects 
that "it is simply not very easy to identify this good of marriage with an end of 
marriage." Here he is indeed creating his own difficulty. Of course it is not easy (in fact 
it is impossible), to make this identification, for the simple reason that the 
coniugum> is not a , in the proper sense in which this term is 
used in Canon Law.
 Technical as the point may be, it is nevertheless an elementary error (and inexcusable if 
one wishes to write seriously on this subject) to treat  "good of the spouses" as if it 
were in the line of the traditional three  formulated by St. Augustine. As the 
well known Italian canonist, F. Bersini, writes, "the  has nothing to 
do with the Augustinian <'bona>.'"  
 In the Augustinian view, the three traditional bona are "goods" or values of marriage 
which particularly show its dignity and goodness. They are the  (the 
faithful exclusiveness of the martial commitment), the  (its 
permanence) and the  (its procreative orientation). The Augustinian 
 refer to positive and essential features of matrimony that give it dignity. 
Marriage is good because it is characterized by faithfulness, permanence, and openness 
to having children. Each  is predicated or or attributed to 
mariage. Offspring is a  and so is exclusiveness or permanence. It 
is evident, then, that Augustine is speaking of the values or essential properties of 
marriage, not of its ends or finalities. The term  does not express a 
value or property of marriage in any sense parallel to that of the Augustinian "goods." 
The  of this new term is not predicated of, or attributed to, marriage; it is 
referred not to marriage (as if it were a value that makes marriage good), but to the 
 (as involving something that is good for them). It denotes not a property of 
marriage (a ), but something--the "good" or welfare or maturing 
of the spouses--which marriage should cause or lead to. This confirms that the 
coniugum> is in the line not of property, but of finality or end.
 Confused ideas generate confused ideas. I do hold, as Polonaise asserts, that the 
Church presents marriage today as having "two equal and interrelated ends." It is he, 
however, not I, who creates further confusion for himself when he goes on to assert (in 
order to criticize my position) that these two ends "are the two goods mentioned in the 
definition of marriage in the new Code... the , the good of the 
couple, and the , the good of offspring."  But canon1055 does not say 
that the  is an end of marriage; rather it says this of the 
procreation/education of children.
The distinction between and "procreation" may again seem over-
technical or abstruse, but I can assure your readers that it is of no small importance. The 
 (or "openness to procreation") is an essential feature of the marital 
relationship; no true marriage can be constituted if it is absent. Procreation is an  
of marriage; a marriage can be valid even if that end is not achieved. The reason is 
clear. It lies within a person's power to share his procreative potential with another; and 
to be prepared to do so is necessary for valid marital consent. There is therefore a 
ad bonum prolis>, a right that the other accepts the "procreativity" of the conjugal 
relationship; to exclude the  from one's marital consent invalidates it. 
However, there is no right to actual procreation--for that does not lie totally under a 
person's will, it depends ultimately on God.
 It is true that some canonists have used the term  as equivalent to 
procreation. This has always been incorrect (confusing a property with an end); it has 
become especially important today to avoid such incorrection. There is just one step 
from saying, correctly, that there is an -- a right to openness to 
offspring--to incorrectly positing a ius ad prolem, a right to actually  a child. 
Questions related to  fertilization, for example, are seen by many people in 
terms of such a "right." The new  (2378) grasps the issue very firmly: "A 
child is not something owed to one, but is a gift. The 'supreme gift of marriage' is a 
human person. A child may not be considered a piece of property, an idea to which an 
alleged 'right to a child' would lead." There is a right that one's partner in the married 
covenant does not exclude what God may give; but each child in the end is a gift of 
 Since it is probably of little interest here to go further into these important though 
subtle distinctions, I would refer any reader wishing for a more developed exposition, 
to a canonical article of mine, "The  and the ; Ends 
or Properties of Marriage?" in  of 1989.
 Polonaise takes Canon 1057 of the new Code to task, with its new description of the 
"object of matrimonial consent." He says that the object of the act of consent and the 
 "are now legal concepts about as broad as one can imagine, and 
this is the key to understanding the explosion of annulments." If he feels so, why does 
he not try to give concrete juridic content to these concepts, instead of dismissing them 
as aberrations? It may be that in certain tribunals, as he suggests, "the 
coniugum> and the mutual gift of self that constitutes the object of consent are defined 
as including the right to a happy marriage, to a partner with a mature personality and 
to whatever else pertains to this dimension of conjugal communion." If so, then these 
tribunals have not formed a correct idea of the meaning of these terms; but I do not feel 
that Polonaise's criticism will help them to see their actual positive content, and 
therefore also their proper application for juridic purposes (which is the reason for their 
inclusion in the Code).
 Here, it could be noted, Polonaise tends to confuse three distinct concepts: the "good of 
the spouses," the "self-giving and accepting" of marital consent, and the "communion of 
life and love." The first two of these terms have been fully incorporated into the new 
Code. The third--the --has not. It remains a very beautiful 
phrase from  , with great pastoral value, but without juridic 
standing. So while married personalism certainly did find its way into the new Code, it 
did so not in the phrase, , but most notably (along with the 
) in the expression, , by which 
canon 1057 describes marital consent.  
 Polonaise seems to regret the new Code, and to be particularly suspicious of the 
concepts of "good of the spouse" and of "self-giving/accepting" as the object of conjugal 
consent. I think we have an excellent Code (so long as it is understood and observed), 
and find in these two phrases keys to a deeper and more human understanding of the 
marital covenant which should have the effect of strengthening people's approach to 
marriage and their way of living it. I have written on several aspects of this elsewhere, 
and will limit myself to some brief ideas here. I would like to do so in the context of 
that other problem which seems to me more important than the question of 
annulments; the growing number of failed marriages.
 Some significant factors underlying this critical phenomenon can be suggested. One 
that seems peculiar to our times is the growing rift between men and women. The 
relationship between the sexes is marked more and more by suspicion and tension, 
division, and even antagonism. The idea that man and woman are somehow made for 
each other, and made for that particular type of union called marriage--an idea that has 
come down the centuries--is under threat. Unions still occur or are attempted--in some 
marital or quasi-marital form--but they tend not to last.
 People, at least in Western countries, have become deeply skeptical about a permanent 
husband-wife relationship. They are no longer convinced that it is worth making and 
can be stuck to. This loss of faith in marriage, with the fundamental pessimism it 
denotes about the possibilities of finding a happy and lasting love in life, implies a 
major crisis for humanity.
 Catholics too, in ever larger numbers, are coming to think that marriage-open-to-
divorce is better than marriage-bound-to-indissolubility. In theological terms, this 
could be seen as a temptation against faith, since indissolubility is a defined dogma. As 
such, it is no small temptation. Yet its possible occurrence should come as less of a 
surprise when we recall the reaction provoked by Jesus when he insisted that according 
to the original divine plan, the marriage bond is unbreakable. If things are so--his very 
Apostles felt--then it is better not to marry (Mt 19,10). But of course they were wrong. 
Things are so; and it is still good--a great good--to marry.
 Current misgivings about the value of indissolubility have no less serious 
anthropological implications, reflected in the idea that faithfulness to a lasting 
commitment, however, freely undertaken, is not reasonably to be expected; it is 
something beyond human nature and people are not capable of it. As this view 
spreads, it creates a mindset hostile to any type of permanent commitment: the 
priesthood and religious life included, as well as marriage. This is another major and 
growing crisis of our days.
 The idea that indissolubility is a bad thing--for which there must be a way out--has 
effects on both people and pastors. Those contemplating marriage approach it less 
seriously; and when they do marry, strive less to keep their marriage going, as it later 
on becomes subject to stress. For their part, pastors and counselors may in pre-marriage 
instruction tend to prepare couples less for the difficulties they are going to meet, and 
may not be sufficiently positive and supportive with couples who are going through 
the actual experience of difficulty. We are going way off track when the 'solution' being 
offered for difficult marital situations is not, "try to make a go of it, pray, rely on grace," 
but more and more: "seek a way out, a 'good faith' solution, an annulment..." Things 
will continue to deteriorate unless we can achieve a re-evaluation of the commitment of 
marriage, which brings out especially the goodness and appeal of the permanent nature 
of the conjugal covenant.
 Vatican II sought to offer a renewed vision of marriage, of marital love and 
commitment. How is it that this renewed vision seems so infrequently to have been 
translated into practice? A main reason, I feel, is that much post-conciliar reflection on 
marriage has not always grasped the Christian anthropology which is a key to conciliar 
thinking about human realities, especially as applied to the marital covenant. The result 
is that the understanding and presentation of marriage has been largely, though no 
doubt unconsciously, colored by the secular anthropology dominant in today's world, 
with its individualistic view of the human person, seeing the key to fulfillment in self: 
self-identification, self-assertion, self-concern.
 The current crisis about indissolubility--the tendency to look on it as an "anti-value"--
finds much of its explanation in this individualism, which is  present outside and inside 
the Church. Individualism fosters a fundamentally self-centered approach to marriage, 
seeking to get from it rather than being prepared to give in it: will this--this union, this 
liaison, this arrangement--make me happy? Then marriage becomes at best a tentative 
agreement between two individuals, each inspired by self-interest, rather than a shared 
endeavor of a couple who together want to build a home for themselves and for their 
children. With that approach no marriage is likely to last.
 Contrasted with this individualistic view, we have the distinctive anthropology of 
Vatican II which includes the Christian personalism mentioned earlier. Developed in 
great power by Pope John Paul II, it is fundamental to a deeper human understanding 
of Christian life and of marriage in particular.
 The essence of true personalism is expressed in   (24): "Man can 
fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself." We can only realize or 
fulfill our self, by giving our self. Here is a Gospel program of life in direct contrast 
with the prescription for living so commonly offered by contemporary psychology: 
seek self, find self, identify self, care for self, hold on to yourself, don't let go of 
 While Polonaise may not like canon 1057 of the new Code, it does nevertheless seek to 
find a valid juridic way of expressing this Christian personalism as it applies to 
marriage. The Canon describes matrimonial consent as the act by which the spouses 
"mutually give and accept each other in order to establish a marriage." The very object 
of conjugal consent is thus presented in terms of mutual self-donation--in most striking 
contrast with the  phrase with which the 1917 Code expressed the same 
object. The man gives self as man and husband, the woman as woman and wife; and 
each receives the other as spouse. There is a scope and power in this new formula; there 
is also a challenge to generosity, which seeks not just to receive but especially to give. 
As Paul VI puts it in one of the less remembered passages of  (9): 
"Whoever really loves his marriage partner loves not only for what he receives, but for 
the partner's self, rejoicing that he can enrich his partner with the gift of himself." It is 
possible that the beauty and the demands of what is expressed in all of this have yet to 
be fully appreciated in areas of seminary training and marriage counselling, and 
perhaps also in some tribunal work on marriage cases (including psychological 
 Married personalism equally characterizes canon 1055 when it speaks of the ends of 
marriage. Both ends expressed--good of the spouses and procreation--are personalist; 
just as both are institutional. This latter point should be stressed, for (contrary to some 
ideas circulating) the  is not presented as a personalist end, in 
contrast with the institutional end--which would be procreation. The good of the 
spouses is equally an institutional end, just as much as procreation. This is evident from 
the dual account given by Genesis of the creation of man and woman. The first account-
-"God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and 
female he created them... and said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply'" (Gen 1:27-28)--is 
clearly procreational. The second--"then the Lord God said, 'It is not good that the man 
should be alone: I will make him a helper fit for him'" (Gen 2:18)--is clearly personalist. 
Therefore, while the two ends can be distinguished, they should not be over-contrasted, 
for both are institutional ends. That is why I hold that, more than any possible 
hierarchy between them, it is their inseparability which needs to be understood and 
 To me, perhaps the major need and challenge today is to see and present 
indissolubility as an element that, corresponding to the nature of genuine human love, 
makes (if its demands are lived up to) for the good of the spouses and for their 
happiness and fulfillment as persons.
 God could have created the human race in a unisex or sexless pattern, and provided 
for its continuation otherwise than by sex. Genesis seems to make it clear that creation 
would have been less good if he had done so; "it is not good for man--or woman--to be 
alone." So sexuality appears in the Bible as part of a plan for personal fulfillment, a 
factor meant to contribute to the perfecting of the human being. The basic 
anthropological point is that the human persona is not self-sufficient, but needs others, 
with a special need for an "other," a partner, a spouse.
 Each human person, in the awareness of his contingency, wishes to be loved: to be in 
some way unique for someone. Each one, if he does not find anyone to love him, is 
haunted by the temptation to feel worthless. Further, it is not enough to be loved; it is 
necessary to love. A person who is loved can be unhappy if he is unable to love. 
Everyone is loved (at least by God); not everyone learns to love. To learn to love is as 
great a human need as to know oneself loved; only so can a person be saved from self-
pity or self-isolation, or from both.
 To learn to love demands coming out of self: through firm dedication--in good times 
and bad--to another, to others. What a person has to learn is not passing love, but 
committed love. We all stand in need of a commitment to love. Such is the priesthood, 
or a life dedicated directly to God. And such is marriage, the dedication to which God 
calls the majority. To bind people to the process of learning to love was God's original 
design for marriage, confirmed by Our Lord (Mt 19:8). The married commitment is by 
nature something demanding. This is brought out by the words with which the spouses 
express their mutual acceptance of one another, "for better or for worse, for richer or for 
poorer, in sickness and in health... all the days of my life."
 Therefore, one can and should find a natural and vital connection between the two 
ideas--"good of the spouses" and marital "giving/accepting," although certainly not in 
the way Polonaise connects them. Marital consent means not just to "give" oneself, but 
also to accept one's partner--with his limitations. This is not easy, least of all for a 
lifetime, but if tackled with the help of grace it can be achieved. And such a mutual and 
demanding commitment powerfully matures the spouses--from which develops the 
good implied in the . This is where Polonaise (and perhaps many 
others) seem to pay insufficient attention to the precise wording of the canon in 
describing the scope of marital consent: ""-"the 
spouses give and accept each other." The giving of self proper to marriage is 
complemented by the acceptance of the self of the other.
 Each one gives as he is, defects and all; and has the conjugal right to be accepted so. 
Just as the commitment of each involves the conjugal duty to accept the other as he or 
she is, defects and all. The gift of a defective self has its noble marital complement and 
correspondence in the acceptance of a defective other.
 Human love, made faithful with God's grace, can turn the meeting and union of two 
imperfect selves to great good for both. It is in learning to love each other in their 
imperfection, that they can achieve perfection. No other realistic way of learning to love 
is open.
 While this commitment is indeed demanding, it is also deeply natural and attractive. 
Real love means it when it says, "I'll love you for always." Proper anthropology should 
place clearer stress here on the fact that human beings, in distinction to animals, are 
created not just with a sexual instinct, but with a conjugal instinct--that is super-added 
on the human level to the mere sexual instinct. Animals seek a mate. Man and woman, 
if they understand their own nature, seek a spouse.
 The sexual instinct is natural, developing by itself and quick to make itself present. 
More than development, it needs control; it is often more intense toward one person, 
but not normally limited to one. The conjugal instinct is also natural, though slower to 
make itself present; it needs to be developed; it scarcely needs to be controlled; it is 
generally limited to one person.
 The conjugal instinct draws man and woman to total commitment to one person, to a 
permanent association or covenant of love, and to be faithful to that freely assumed 
commitment. The widespread frustration in the area of sex which people sense today, is 
a frustration of conjugality rather than of mere sexuality. As the conjugal instinct is 
understood, developed and matured, it tends strongly to facilitate sexual control, by 
inducing sexual respect. It is normal for a young couple in love to have an ideal of 
marriage before them: each sees the other as possible life-companion, and mother or 
father of one's future children: someone therefore who can be absolutely unique in 
one's life. These are primary truths of conjugal sexuality which our modern world 
seems to be losing sight of; hence the gradual loss of mutual esteem between the sexes. 
While this applies reciprocally in the sexual relationship, it has a particular application 
in how a man relates to a oman. If nothing so much as motherhood or potential 
motherhood makes a man respect a woman, this is because it raises her above the 
category of an object to be possessed and establishes her in that of a subject to be 
 It is easy to love good people. The program of Christianity is that we also learn to love 
"bad" people--people with defects. Within the context of marriage, its particular 
program is that whoever freely enters the marital covenant of love and life with 
another--no doubt because he or she sees unique goodness in that person--should be 
prepared to remain faithful to the covenant, even if later on objective or subjective 
considerations make the other seem to have lost any exceptional goodness and to be 
characterized rather by a series of maddening defects. That is, I repeat, what lend a 
particular force to canon 1057, with its insistence that true marital consent means not 
only giving self, but also accepting the other: as each one is.
 The discovery of mutual defects in marriage is inevitable; however, it is not 
incompatible with the fulfillment of the good of the spouses. On the contrary, one can 
say that the experience of mutual defects is essential if married life itself is to achieve 
the true divine idea of the . As effortless romance fades, the stage is 
set for each of the spouses to get down to the business of learning to love the other as he 
or she really is. It is then that they grow as persons. Here lies the seriousness and 
beauty of the challenge contained in marriage: this remains a central point to be 
stressed in education and counselling.
 Romance is almost sure to die; love however does not have to die with it. Love is 
meant to mature, and can do so if that readiness for sacrifice implied in the original 
self-giving of marital consent is alive or can be activated. "The idea that true love is 
prepared for sacrifice strikes a chord which perhaps our catechesis, counselling and 
preaching need to touch on more. As Pope John Paul II stated in a 1982 general 
audience: "It is natural for the human heart to accept demands, even difficult ones, in 
the name of love for an ideal, and above all in the name of love for a person." And 
 (34) says: "sacrifice cannot be removed from family life, but 
must in fact be wholeheartedly accepted if the love between husband and wife is to be 
deepened and become a source of intimate joy."
 Human nature is a mixture and conflict of good and bad tendencies. Are educators, 
pastors, counselors, appealing sufficiently to the good tendencies? Or do we yield at 
times to the temptation to think that the bad are more powerful? We need to strengthen 
our faith not only in God, but also in the goodness of his creation, recalling what St. 
Thomas Aquinas teaches, "." Good is more 
powerful than evil, and its appeal strikes deeper into our nature, for goodness rooted in 
truth remains the most fundamental need of the human person.
 Contrary tendencies can be natural. In the face of danger it is natural to feel tempted to 
be a coward and run away. But it also natural to want to be brave and face the danger. 
A mother or father may have a natural tendency towards selfishness; yet they have a no 
less natural tendency to care for their children: a maternal or paternal instinct. 
Similarly, while it is natural for stains to develop between husband and wife, it is also 
natural for them to want to preserve their love from the threat of these strains. What we 
have called the conjugal instinct calls them to be faithful; whereas a person senses 
something soft, mean and selfish, in a refusal to face up to the challenge of fidelity.
 As against this, there would seem to be little that is natural, and nothing that is 
inevitable, in the phenomenon that two people who at one moment thought each other 
absolutely unique, should end up five or ten years later unable to stand one another. 
"My love for him has died..." If such were to happen, it would have been a gradual 
death and one that could often have been prevented by good counsel from relatives, 
friends, pastors.
 It is easy to make the marital commitment. It is not easy to maintain it, to perfect it, so 
reaching, as  says, "that maturity in self-giving to which human 
freedom is called." Along with prayer and the sacraments, people need to be reminded 
of a main key to success in conjugal love (the love, I repeat, that binds together two 
defective persons); learning to forgive and asking for forgiveness. Each time husband 
and wife acknowledges his defects to the other, hebecomes more human, and therefore 
more lovable. The husband and wife who denies his defects or seeks to justify them, 
becomes more proud, more isolated; less loving and less lovable.
 Not only the spouses themselves, but their relatives and friends need to be taught to 
understand and respect the demanding beauty of the conjugal relationship, in the life-
long task of learning to love. People need support: from relations and friends first; and 
then from pastors and counsellors. There is need for a constant catechesis which shows 
a new appreciation of the commitment involved in marriage, especially of the goodness 
of the bond; so that the very beginnings of trouble are met with positive help and 
advice, not with encouragement to seek an annulment (which may not be granted in 
the end). Friends and neighbors need all to be reminded of their grave responsibility to 
be a help and not a hindrance to the perseverance of married persons.
 In conclusion then, and to return to Polonaise, the real problem, as he sees it, is that 
some irresponsible people (including myself) are suggesting that the Church has in fact 
abandoned the older teaching of "primary/secondary" ends n favor of two equally 
ranked ends, and are making the matter worse with meaningless personalist 
 For me, the real problem is that we have lost sight of the full value and purpose of 
marriage, which is not only the begetting of children, but also (in very close connection) 
the growth and maturing of the spouses--their good--in mutual and faithful self-giving, 
and in shared parental dedication to their children.
 For me too, the Christian personalism--also and very particularly as incorporated into 
Canon Law on marriage--is far from meaningless, and also far from "lax." It does not 
open the doors to a flood of annulments, as Polonaise claims (although it certainly 
seeks to cover all the cases in which in justice a nullity should be declared), but it does 
present a much more appealing, though no less exacting, idea of the covenant of 
 At the heart of this problem is a growing loss of faith in love, and in the possibility of 
any permanent commitment to the task of loving. A loss of faith in love, threatening not 
only couples, but also at times counselors and pastors. I doubt, however, that people 
can disbelieve in love for long; or that it is so hard to restore that belief, where it has 
been lost. Nevertheless that must still be classified as a theoretical consideration. And 
when facing a problem of these dimensions, theoretical analyses of it or theoretical 
answers to it, are not enough. It will only be solved by those who, supported by God's 
faithful love, learn to love faithfully. Their practical example can restore belief, 
emulation, and happiness in others.
Msgr. Cormac Burke is a judge of the Roman Rota, the highest appeals court within the 
Catholic Church. Raised in Ireland, and trained in both civil and canon law, he has 
taught in schools in Europe, North America, and Africa. A prolific author, he is the 
1995 recipient of the Linacre Award of the National Federation of Catholic Physicians.

[1] Can. 1055 §1. The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole of life and which is ordered by its nature to the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament between the baptized.