From a little known text by Cardinal
Joseph Ratzinger published in 1998
The pastoral approach to marriage
must be founded on truth
Concerning some objections to the
Church’s teaching on the reception of Holy Communion by divorced and remarried
members of the faithful
In 1998 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Prefect of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, introduced the volume: “On the
Pastoral Care of the Divorced and Remarried”, published by the Libreria
Editrice Vaticana in the dicastery’s series “Documenti e Studi”, 17. Because of
its interest in our day and its breadth of perspective, we reproduce the third
part along with three additional notes. This text is also available on the
newspaper’s website (www.osservatoreromano.va) in English, Italian, French,
German, Portuguese and Spanish.
The Letter of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith of 14 September 1994 concerning the reception of Holy
Communion by divorced and remarried members of the faithful was met with a very
lively response across wide sections of the Church. Along with many positive
reactions, more than a few critical voices were also heard. The fundamental
objections against the teaching and practice of the Church are outlined below
in simplified form.
Several of the more
significant objections — principally, the reference to the supposedly more
flexible practice of the Church Fathers which would be the inspiration for the
practice of the Eastern Churches separated from Rome, as well as the allusion
to the traditional principles of epicheia and of aequitas
canonica — were
studied in-depth by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Articles by
Professors Pelland, Marcuzzi and Rodriguez Luño (1), among others, were
developed in the course of this study. The main conclusions of the research,
which suggest the direction of an answer to the objections, will be briefly
summarized here.
1. Some maintain that several passages of the
New Testament suggest that the words of Jesus on the indissolubility of
marriage allow for a flexible application and cannot be classified in a
strictly legal sense.
Several exegetes point out critically that
with regard to the indissolubility of marriage, the Magisterium cites almost
exclusively one pericope — namely, Mk. 10:11-12 — and does not sufficiently
take into account other passages from the Gospel of Matthew and the First
Letter to Corinthians. They claim that these biblical passages speak of a
certain exception to the Lord’s words about the indissolubility of marriage,
notably in the case of porneia (Mt 5:32; 19:9) and in the case of
separation because of the faith (1 Cor 7:12-16). They hold that these texts
should be an indication that, already in apostolic times, Christians in
difficult situations had known a flexible application of the words of Jesus.
In replying to this objection, one notes that
magisterial documents do not intend to present the biblical foundations of the
teachings on marriage in a complete and exhaustive way. They entrust this
important task to competent experts. The Magisterium emphasizes, however, that
the teaching of the Church on the indissolubility of marriage is faithful to
the words of Jesus. Jesus clearly identifies the Old Testament practice of
divorce as a consequence of the hardness of the human heart. He refers — over
and above the law — to the beginning of creation, to the will of the Creator,
and summarizes his teaching with the words: “Therefore what God has joined
together, no human being must separate” (Mk 10:9). With the coming of the
Redeemer, marriage is therefore restored to its original form intended at
creation and is wrested away from human arbitrariness — above all from the whim
of the husband, since for wives there really was no possibility of divorce.
Jesus’ words on the indissolubility of marriage overcome the old order of the
law with the new order of faith and grace. Only in this way can marriage fully
become a God-given vocation to love and human dignity and the sign of the
unconditional covenant of divine love, i.e., a sacrament (cf. Eph 5:32).
The possibility of separation, which Paul
discusses in 1 Cor. 7, regards marriage between a Christian and a non-baptized
person. Later theological reflection has clarified that only marriages between
baptized persons are a sacrament in the strict sense of the word, and that
absolute indissolubility holds only for those marriages falling within the
scope of Christian faith. So-called “natural marriage” has its dignity from the
order of creation and is therefore oriented toward indissolubility, but it can
be dissolved under certain circumstances because of a higher good — which in
this case is faith. This is how systematic theology correctly classified St Paul’s reference as
the privilegium paulinum, that is, the possibility of
dissolving a non-sacramental marriage for the good of the faith. The
indissolubility of a truly sacramental marriage remains safeguarded; it is not
therefore an exception to the word of the Lord. We will come back to this
later.
Extensive literature exists regarding the
correct understanding of the porneia clauses, with many differing
and even conflicting hypotheses. There is no unanimity among exegetes on this
point. Many maintain that it refers to invalid marital unions, not to an
exception to the indissolubility of marriage. In any case, the Church cannot
construct her doctrine and praxis on uncertain exegetical hypotheses. She must
adhere to the clear teaching of Christ.
2. Others object that the patristic tradition
leaves room for a more varied praxis, which would be more equitable in
difficult situations; furthermore, the Catholic Church could learn from the
principle of “economy” employed by Eastern Churches separated from Rome.
It is claimed that the current Magisterium
relies on only one strand of the patristic tradition, and not on the whole
legacy of the ancient Church. Although the Fathers clearly held fast to the
doctrinal principle of the indissolubility of marriage, some of them tolerated
a certain flexibility on the pastoral level with regard to difficult individual
cases. On this basis Eastern Churches separated from Rome later developed
alongside the principle of akribia, fidelity to revealed truth,
that of oikonomia, benevolent leniency in
difficult situations. Without renouncing the doctrine of the indissolubility of
marriage, in some cases they permit a second and even a third marriage, which
is distinct, however, from the sacramental first marriage and is marked by a
penitential character. Some say that this practice has never been explicitly
condemned by the Catholic Church. They claim that the 1980 Synod of Bishops
proposed to study this tradition thoroughly, in order to allow the mercy of God
to be more resplendent.
Father Pelland’s study points out the
direction in which the answers to these questions can be sought. Naturally, for
the interpretation of individual patristic texts, the work of historians is
necessary. Because of the difficult textual issues involved, controversies will
not be lacking in the future. Theologically, one must affirm the following:
a. There exists a clear consensus among the
Fathers regarding the indissolubility of marriage. Since it derives from the
will of the Lord, the Church has no authority over it. For this reason, from
the outset Christian marriage was distinct from marriage in Roman society, even
though in the first centuries there did not yet exist any canonical system. The
Church in the time of the Fathers clearly excluded divorce and remarriage,
precisely out of faithful obedience to the New Testament.
b. In the Church at the time of the Fathers,
divorced and remarried members of the faithful were never officially admitted
to Holy Communion after a time of penance. It is true, however, that the Church
did not always rigorously revoke concessions in certain territories, even when
they were identified as not in agreement with her doctrine and discipline. It
also seems true that individual Fathers, Leo the Great being among them, sought
pastoral solutions for rare borderline cases.
c. This led to two opposing developments:
— In the Imperial
Church after Constantine, with the ever stronger interplay
between Church and State, a greater flexibility and readiness for compromise in
difficult marital situations was sought. Up until the Gregorian reform, a
similar tendency was present in Gallic and Germanic lands. In the Eastern
Churches separated from Rome,
this development progressed farther in the second millennium and led to an
increasingly more liberal praxis. Today in some of these Churches there are
numerous grounds for divorce, even a theology of divorce, which is in no way
compatible with Jesus’ words regarding the indissolubility of marriage. Without
fail, this problem must be addressed in ecumenical dialogue.
— In the West, on account of the Gregorian
reform, the original concept of the Church Fathers was recovered. This
development came to its conclusion at the Council of Trent and was once again
expressed as a doctrine of the Church at the Second Vatican Council.
On doctrinal grounds, the praxis of the
Eastern Churches separated from Rome cannot be taken up by the Catholic Church,
as it is the result of a complex historical process, an increasingly liberal —
and thus more and more removed from 
the words of the Lord —
interpretation of several obscure patristic texts which were significantly
influenced by civil law. Furthermore, the claim is incorrect that the Church
simply tolerated such a praxis. Admittedly, the Council of Trent did not
pronounce any explicit condemnation. The medieval canonists, however,
consistently spoke of the praxis as improper. Furthermore, there is evidence
that groups of Orthodox believers who became Catholic had to sign a profession
of faith with an explicit reference to the impossibility of a second marriage.
3. Many propose to allow exceptions to the
Church’s norm on the basis of the traditional principles of epikeia and aequitas
canonica.
Certain marriage cases, it is said, cannot be
handled in the external forum. Some claim that the Church should not simply
rely on juridical norms, but on the contrary ought to respect and tolerate the
conscience of the individual. They say that theological notions of epikeia andaequitas canonica could serve to justify, from moral
theology as well as juridically, a decision of conscience at variance from the
general norm. Especially regarding the question of receiving the sacraments,
they claim that the Church should take some steps forward and not just issue
prohibitions to the faithful.
The contributions made by Professor Marcuzzi
and Professor Rodríguez Luño throw light on his complex problem. To this end,
there are three areas of inquiry which clearly need to be distinguished from
each other:
a. Epikeia and aequitas canonica exist in the sphere of human and
purely ecclesiastical norms of great significance, but cannot be applied to
those norms over which the Church has no discretionary authority. The
indissoluble nature of marriage is one of these norms which goes back to Christ
Himself and is thus identified as a norm of divine law. The Church cannot
sanction pastoral practices — for example, sacramental pastoral practices -
which contradict the clear instruction of the Lord.
In other words, if the prior marriage of two
divorced and remarried members of the faithful was valid, under no
circumstances can their new union be considered lawful and therefore reception
of the sacraments is intrinsically impossible. The conscience of the individual
is bound to this norm without exception. (2)
b. However the Church has the authority to
clarify those conditions which must be fulfilled for a marriage to be
considered indissoluble according to the sense of Jesus’ teaching. In line with
the Pauline assertion in 1 Cor. 7, she established that only two baptized
Christians can enter into a sacramental marriage. She developed the legal
concept of the Pauline privilege and the Petrine privilege. With reference to
the porneia clauses
in Matthew and in Acts 15:20, the impediments to marriage were established.
Furthermore, grounds for the nullity of marriage were identified with ever
greater clarity, and the procedural system was developed in greater detail. All
of this contributed to delineating and articulating more precisely the concept
of the indissolubility of marriage. One can say that, in this way, the Western Church also made allowance for the
principle of oikonomia, but without touching the
indissolubility of marriage as such. The further juridical development of the
1983 Code of Canon Lawwas in this same direction, granting
probative force to the declarations of the parties. Therefore, according to
experts in this area, it seems that cases in which an invalid marriage cannot
be shown to be such by the procedural are practically excluded.
Since marriage has a fundamental public
ecclesial character and the axiom applies that nemo
iudex in propria causa (no
one is judge in his own case), marital cases must be resolved in the external
forum. If divorced and remarried members of the faithful believe that their
prior marriage was invalid, they are thereby obligated to appeal to the
competent marriage tribunal so that the question will be examined objectively
and under all available juridical possibilities.
c. Admittedly, it cannot be excluded that
mistakes occur in marriage cases. In some parts of the Church, well-functioning
marriage tribunals still do not exist. Occasionally, such cases last an
excessive amount of time. Once in a while they conclude with questionable
decisions. Here it seems that the application of epikeia in the internal forum is not
automatically excluded from the outset. This is implied in the 1994 letter of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in which it was stated that new
canonical ways of demonstrating nullity should exclude “as far as possible”
every divergence from the truth verifiable in the judicial process (cf. n. 9).
Some theologians are of the opinion that the faithful ought to adhere strictly
even in the internal forum to juridical decisions which they believe to be
false. Others maintain that exceptions are possible here in the internal forum,
because the juridical forum does not deal with norms of divine law, but rather
with norms of ecclesiastical law. This question, however, demands further study
and clarification. Admittedly, the conditions for asserting an exception would
need to be clarified very precisely, in order to avoid arbitrariness and to
safeguard the public character of marriage, removing it from subjective
decisions.
4. Some accuse the current Magisterium of
reversing the doctrinal development of the Council and of substituting a
pre-conciliar view of marriage.
Some theologians claim that at the new
magisterial documents having to do with questions of marriage are based on a
naturalistic, legalistic concept of marriage. Attention is given to the
contract between the spouses and to the ius in corpus. It is claimed that the Council
overturned this static understanding and described marriage in a more personalistic
way as a covenant of love and life. Thus it would have opened up possibilities
for resolving difficult situations more humanely. Thinking further along this
line, some scholars pose the question of whether or not one could speak of the
death of the marriage, if the personal bond of love between the spouses no
longer exists. Others resurrect the old question of whether or not the Pope
would have the capability of dissolving marriage in such cases.
Yet anyone who attentively reads the more
recent statements of the Church will note that their central assertions are
based on Gaudium et spes and that they further develop the
teaching contained therein in a thoroughly personalist line, in the direction
indicated by the Council. However, it is inappropriate to set up a
contradiction between the personalist and juridical views of marriage. The
Council did not break with the traditional concept of marriage, but on the
contrary developed it further. When, for example, it is continually pointed out
that the Council substituted the broader and theologically more profound
concept of covenant for the strictly legal concept of contract, one must not
forget that within covenant, the element of contract is also contained and
indeed placed within a broader perspective. The fact that marriage reaches well
beyond the purely juridical realm into the depths of humanity and into the
mystery of the divine, has always been indicated by the word “sacrament”,
although often it has not been pondered with the same clarity which the Council
gave to these aspects. Law is not everything, but it is an indispensable part,
one dimension of the whole. Marriage without a juridical dimension which
integrates it into the whole fabric of society and the Church simply does not
exist. If the post-Conciliar revision of canon law included the realm of
marriage, this is not a betrayal of the Council, but the implementation of its
mandate.
If the Church were to accept the theory that a
marriage is dead when the two spouses no longer love one another, then she
would thereby sanction divorce and would uphold the indissolubility of marriage
only in word, and no longer in fact. Therefore, the opinion that the Pope could
potentially dissolve a consummated sacramental marriage, which has been irrevocably
broken, must be considered erroneous. Such a marriage cannot be dissolved by
anyone. At their wedding, the spouses promise to be faithful to each other
until death.
Further study is required, however, concerning
the question of whether non-believing Christians — baptized persons who never
or who no longer believe in God — can truly enter into a sacramental marriage.
In other words, it needs to be clarified whether every marriage between two
baptized persons is ipso facto a sacramental marriage. In fact, the
Code states that only a “valid” marriage between baptized persons is at the
same time a sacrament (cf. cic, can. 1055, § 2). Faith belongs to the essence
of the sacrament; what remains to be clarified is the juridical question of
what evidence of the “absence of faith” would have as a consequence that the
sacrament does not come into being. (3)
5. Many argue that the position of the Church
on the question of divorced and remarried faithful is overly legalistic and not
pastoral.
A series of critical objections against the
doctrine and praxis of the Church pertain to questions of a pastoral nature.
Some say, for example, that the language used in the ecclesial documents is too
legalistic, that the rigidity of law prevails over an understanding of dramatic
human situations. They claim that the human person of today is no longer able
to
understand such language, that Jesus would
have had an open ear for the needs of people, particularly for those on the
margins of society. They say that the Church, on the other hand, presents
herself like a judge who excludes wounded people from the sacraments and from
certain public responsibilities.
One can readily admit that the Magisterium’s
manner of expression does not seem very easy to understand at times. It needs
to be translated by preachers and catechists into a language which relates to
people and to their respective cultural environments. The essential content of
the Church’s teaching, however, must be upheld in this process. It must not be
watered down on allegedly pastoral grounds, because it communicates the
revealed truth.
Certainly, it is difficult to make the demands
of the Gospel understandable to secularized people. But this pastoral
difficulty must not lead to compromises with the truth. In his Encyclical Veritatis
splendor, John Paul II clearly rejected so-called pastoral
solutions which stand in opposition to the statements of the Magisterium (cf. ibid.
56).
Furthermore, concerning the position of the
Magisterium as regards the question of divorced and remarried members of the
faithful, it must be stressed that the more recent documents of the Church
bring together the demands of truth with those of love in a very balanced way.
If at times in the past, love shone forth too little in the explanation of the
truth, so today the danger is great that in the name of love, truth is either
to be silenced or compromised. Assuredly, the word of truth can be painful and
uncomfortable. But it is the way to holiness, to peace, and to inner freedom. A
pastoral approach which truly wants to help the people concerned must always be
grounded in the truth. In the end, only the truth can be pastoral. “Then you
will know the truth, and the truth will set you free” (Jn 8:32).
Notes
1 Cf. Angel Rodríguez Luño, L’epicheia
nella cura pastorale dei fedeli divorziati risposati, ibid.,
pp. 75-87; Piero Giorgio Marcuzzi, sdb, Applicazione di “aequitas et epikeia” ai contenuti
della Lettera della Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede del 14 settembre
1994, ibid., pp. 88-98; Gilles Pelland, sj, La
pratica della Chiesa antica relativa ai fedeli divorziati risposati, ibid.,
pp. 99-131.2
2 On this matter the norm referred to by John
Paul II in his Apostolic Letter Familiaris Consortio, n. 84, is quite
valuable: “Reconciliation in the sacrament of Penance which would open the way
to the Eucharist, can only be granted to those who, repenting of having broken
the sign of the Covenant and of fidelity to Christ, are sincerely ready to
undertake a way of life that is no longer in contradiction to the
indissolubility of marriage. This means, in practice, that when, for serious
reasons, such as for example the children’s upbringing, a man and a woman
cannot satisfy the obligation to separate, they ‘take on themselves the duty to
live in complete continence, that is, by abstinence from the acts proper to
married couples’”. See also the Apostolic Letter of Benedict XVI, Sacramentum
Caritatis, n. 29.
3 During the meeting with clergy in the
Diocese of Aosta, which took place 25 July 2005, Pope Benedict XVI spoke of
this difficult question: “those who were married in the Church for the sake of
tradition but were not truly believers, and who later find themselves in a new
and invalid marriage and subsequently convert, discover faith and feel excluded
from the Sacrament, are in a particularly painful situation. This really is a
cause of great suffering and when I was Prefect of the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, I invited various Bishops’ Conferences and experts to
study this problem: a sacrament celebrated without faith. Whether, in fact, a
moment of invalidity could be discovered here because the Sacrament was found
to be lacking a fundamental dimension, I do not dare to say. I personally
thought so, but from the discussions we had I realized that it is a highly
complex problem and ought to be studied further. But given these people’s
painful plight, it must be studied further”.
