The Task of Benedict XVI: Broaden Reason
As Antidote to False Modernism
“We will succeed in (broadening our concept of reason
and its application) only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we
overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable,
and if we once more disclose its vast horizons” Benedict XVI, Regensburg 2006
The Restriction of Reason: As far back as 1993,
Joseph Ratzinger explained that relativism and subjectivism were the product of
a reason starving for the absolute and the infinite that had been methodically
restricted and silenced by the alleged certainties of natural or applied
sciences. He said that “this restriction of reason has the result
that we are left in almost total darkness regarding some essential dimensions
of life. The meaning of man, the bases of ethics, the question of God cannot be
subjected to rational experience, certified by mathematical formulae. And so
they are left to subjective sensibility alone. This is serious because if, in a
society, the bases of ethical behavior are abandoned to subjectivity alone,
released from common motives for being and living, handed over to pragmatism,
then it is man himself who is threatened.”
And then, presciently, he observed that “in the present situation of emptiness,
there looms the terrible danger of nihilism, that is to say, the denial or
absence of all fundamental moral reference for the conduct of social life. This
danger becomes visible in the new forms of terrorism.”
John Paul II
pronounced the same diagnosis over the state of reason and the projected
fallout: “Reason… has wilted under the weight of so much knowledge and little by
little has lost the capacity to lift it is gaze to the heights, to daring to
rise to the
What has
been lost to reason – wherever the gift of self has been lacking and “acedia”
(accedie)
as a turning back on self has dominated - is full access to reality as the
being of the believing person. That access is the experience of the act of being
of the believing person without the diminishment or distortion by mediations
such as sensible perception or conceptualizations.
The
theology that stands behind the above is the following: the human person has
been created in the image and likeness of the divine Persons. Since they are
pure relations vectoring in different directions like Father engendering Son,
Son glorifying Father, Spirit personifying the “opposing” relational self-gift
of the Two, no one can be given without the other two. If there were no Father,
there would be no Son since the Father is the very act of engendering the Son,
etc. Hence, the God of the three irreducibly different Relations is “One” as a
“communio” where each needs the other to be.
Made in the
image of the Son, the human person is also a relation, but created, and
therefore with the need to activate the relation that will be self-gift in
obedience to God and in the service of the others. The exegesis of John Paul II
in the “Theology of the Body” discloses the activation of self-awareness of
Adam when he (Adam) accepts the relation of obedience to the Creator in the act
of naming the animals. The resulting state of “being alone” signifies that Adam
had crossed the threshold from simply being aware of “things” as objects to
becoming aware of self as “I,” a subject. He thus experienced being alone as a
subject in a universe of objects.
This
cognition is not conceptual (yet) since it is simply mirroring the act of
self-dominion and self-determination to be the self-gift of obedience. All the
other acts of cognition that are directed toward sensible phenomena are
conceptual. This particular act produces a different type of experience with
the type of cognition that we call “consciousness.” It
is important to note that consciousness of the self only takes place
on the occasion of the self-transcendence of the self, i.e.,
when the “I” experiences itself receiving self-identity from another as from
the mother from conception onward, mastering self to make the gift to another. Wherever
there is the act and experience of self-transcendence, there is consciousness
on the level of the subject as subject.
The content
of that consciousness, when it is self-gift, is a consciousness of God, and
this because wherever there is a relation that is self-transcending, there is
divinization. And, as Benedict said in Brazil in May of 2007: “Only
God knows God.” Of
course, this is only to repeat Matthew 11, 27: “No one knows the Son except the
Father; nor does anyone know the Father except the Son and him to whom the Son
chooses to reveal him.”
And, to
finish this brief but intense “foreword,” let me present Ratzinger’s compressed
“theological epistemology:”
- Scripture
reveals the Person of Jesus Christ to be prayer: Lk. 6, 25; Lk. 9, 18; Lk.
9, 28.
- Like
is known by like.
- Therefore,
only he who experiences himself to be such and so in the act of
self-giving prayer, experiences himself to be another Christ, “Ipse
Christus.” The ontological architecture of one who truly prays is an
activated relationality, and will be called “Petros” by Him Who is “Corner
Stone,” the paradigm of relationality.
- Only
then, by reflection on the consciousness of the self in prayer, will such
an active believer be able to conceptualize the content of his
self-consciousness and transfer to Jesus of Nazareth: “You are the Christ,
the Son of the living God” (Mt. 16, 16).
This, and this alone, is the reconstitution of reason to
know the living God experientially, and to create the context within which all
subsequent knowledge finds “meaning.”
* * * * * * * * * * *
* * *
Benedict announced in his “The New Evangelization” (2000)
that the crisis of our times is the knowledge of God.
“The
true problem of our times is the ‘Crisis of God,’ the absence of God, disguised
by an empty religiosity… Everything changes, whether God exists or not. Unfortunately
– we Christians also often live as if God did not exists (‘si Deus no
daretur’). We live according to the slogan: God does not exist, and if he
exists, he does not belong.”
The reality
is that “No one has at any time seen God.
The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has revealed him” (Jn.
1, 18). Therefore, if the Word – Jesus Christ - became flesh in my historical time
and space, i.e., within the domain of my experience that involves not only
empirical sensation, but also, and particularly my total experience as a
subject – then I am capable of that experience of Jesus Christ in myself.
The crucial question then becomes:
if the divine Person is a man like me, then to know Him means that I have to
understand who I am as man. That is, what does it mean to be man as a who?
The received report from antiquity and the Middle Ages prior to the Cartesian
turn to the subject claims objectively that man is a rational animal. But the
question we ask ourselves now is: who am I? Joseph Ratzinger tackles the
question of the identity of the ego directly under the rubric of “self-love”
and turns to Scripture for help.
He finds contradictory texts like “For whoever would save his life (his soul)
for my sake and the gospel’s will save it” (Mark 8, 35); or “If anyone comes to me and does not hate
his own father and mother and wife and children and brothers and sisters, yes,
and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple” (Lk. 14, 26).
On the other side, he finds “we
are told we must love our neighbor ‘as
yourself.’ But this means that
self-love, the affirmation of one’s own being, provides the form and measure
for love of one’s neighbor too. According to this self-love remains a natural
and necessary thing without which love of neighbor would lose its foundation.”
Ratzinger assesses the
contradiction by confronting the fact that one cannot love self if one is an
egotist. “One could almost talk of an anthropological circle: to the extent that
people are always seeking themselves, would like to bring about their own
self-realization, and are intent on the success and fulfillment of their ego,
this ego becomes objectionable, annoying, and unsatisfactory. It dissolves itself
into a thousand forms, and in the end all that remains is the flight from
oneself, the inability to stand oneself, the recourse to drugs or to the myriad
other forms of self-contradictory egoism.” In fact, it is possible to
accept oneself only if there is affirmation by another that one is good, and
with the personal identity that accrues from that, one masters and determines
self to go out of self in the service of the other.
What is being stated here is the
key to the theological anthropology of the human person as a “resonating
existential” who
achieves fullness of being – becoming oneself – by the achievable gift of
oneself. The resonation is the (a) finding of self – the subsidiarity of
personal autonomy by the (b) giving of oneself in solidarity. I say
“achievable” because spousal love is pointed in this direction and takes its
meaning from it while martyrdom in the shadow of the Cross of Christ is its
crowning achievement
Faith is a gift from God. It is a
grace as an act of love that makes me capable of saying yes to the audible
announcement of the Word through Scripture, Tradition and the Magisterium of
the Church. But faith is not fully faith until it becomes an act of obedience
of my whole self, just as a word is not really “heard” until it is put into
practice and lived.
As primitive terrain for entering
into the mind of the present pope, one must remember that his “habilitation”
thesis to be a professor of theology in Germany was precisely on this
topic. It was rejected by the then reigning German dogmatist Michael Schmaus
and destined to become a determining principle of Vatican II. It basically
proposed that the believer had to undergo the experience of self-gift in order
to “know” the revealing Subject behind the words of Scripture (whose
ontological profile and architecture was Self-gift, and this because only “like
knows like”). Biblically, spouses “know” one another by becoming one flesh. In
the absence of this ontological one-fleshedness, there is the so-called
“intentional” oneness via mental signs or sensible perceptions. This is knowing
on the level of conceptual common sense and scientific knowing.
But there is another level. There is the
subject that has been disclosed to us by the 300-400 years of so-called
“Enlightenment” philosophy. The “I” from Descartes to the present day has been
erroneously but understandably identified as consciousness since we have no
noetic access to self except through thought. But that does not mean that the
“I” is thought. Wojtyla has had the
immense sensitivity and philosophical intelligence to glimpse behind the
phenomenon “consciousness” to its root and cause, which is the ontological
reality of the “I” as Being.
Concerning faith and experience, Benedict
XVI observed in the synod bishops of Asia (1998):
“Various
Fathers have correctly stated that for the proclamation of Christ’s Gospel
one’s own spiritual experience is a fundamental condition. Only those who know
God through a personal encounter can make God known to others: only those who
live in a deep relationship with Christ can guide others to communion with the
Lord.” He goes on to caution: “However, it is important to distinguish
between faith and experience. Faith is a gift from God, almost an anticipation
given to us by divine love, which precedes our action. In faith, God opens his
heart to us and communicates himself; experience is thus the appropriation and
personalization of faith. Therefore, faith is common and universal; the
experience of it is in itself personal and individual. Only faith unites and
synthesizes our always fragmentary experiences; faith is the criterion and
measure of experience, the guide that gives us light on the path of our
experience.”
Just so
that it stand here clearly, I repeat Ratzinger’s discovery of the mediaeval Bonaventurian
notion of revelation and faith:
“Revelation is always a concept
denoting an act. The word refers to the act in which God shows himself, not to
the objectified result of this act. And because this is so, the receiving
subject is always also a part of the concept of ‘revelation.’ Where there is no
one to perceive ‘revelation,’ no re-vel-ation has occurred, because no veil has
been removed. By definition, revelation requires a someone who apprehends it.
These insights, gained through my reading of Bonaventure, were later on very
important for me at the time of the conciliar discussion on revelation,
Scripture, and tradition. Because, if Bonaventure is right, then revelation
precedes Scripture and becomes deposited in Scripture but is not simply
identical with it. This is turn means that revelation is always something
greater than what is merely written down. And this again means that there can
be no such thing as pure sola Scriptura…because an essential element of
Scripture is the Church as understanding subject, and with this the fundamental
sense of tradition is already given.”
In the actual
thesis, he wrote:
“As far as I can see, at no time
does Bonaventure refer to the Scriptures themselves as ‘revelation.’ He speaks
of revelare and facies revelata primarily when a particular
understanding of Scripture is involved, namely that ‘manifold divine wisdom’
which consists in grasping the three-fold spiritual sense of Scripture – the
allegorical, the anagogical [mystical] and the tropological
[figurative]…. (W)e grasp that which we are to believe not from the letter of
Scripture, but first of all by the use of allegory. The letter by itself is
merely the water which is transformed into wine in the spiritual understanding;
the letter is one which must be changed into bread… Consequently that which is
properly New Testament does not consist in a new book, but in the Spirit who
makes these books full of life. Here, therefore, ‘revelation’ is synonymous
with the spiritual understanding of Scripture; it consists in the God-given act
of understanding, and not in the objective letter alone. Only those who
understand Scripture spiritually have a ‘facies revelata’… Furthermore, we must
say that while only Paul speaks expressly of being taken up into the third
heaven, this was not a privilege of Paul alone. Rather, it was granted to all
the Apostles and inspired writers of Scripture; for it is identical with the
process of inspiration. This means that since Scripture is born from a mystical
contact of the hagiographers with God, it can be understood ultimately only on
a level which must be called ‘mystical.’ It is clear that the meaning of Scripture
lies on the level of the visio intellectualis; anyone who approaches
Scripture on the level of the visio corporalis or spiritualis
will necessarily miss its meaning.
Ratzinger continues: “From
this perspective, we can now understand in a new way why Bonaventure holds that
the content of faith is found not in the letter of Scripture but in the
spiritual meaning lying behind the letter. Furthermore, we can see why it is
that for Bonaventure, Scripture simply as a written document does not
constitute revelation whereas the understanding of Scripture which arises in
theology can be called revelation at least indirectly. We can easily understand
this in view of the process of revelation itself; for in this process,
‘revelation’ is understood to consist precisely in the understanding of the
spiritual sense.”
Ratzinger
here confronts the question if this is subjectivism (“subjective actualism”): “Such
an idea has no foundation in the intellectual world of Bonaventure. For the
deep meaning of Scripture in which we truly find the ‘revelation’ and the
content of faith is not left up to the whim of each individual. It has already
been objectified in part in the teachings of the Fathers and in theology so
that the basic lines are accessible simply by the acceptance of the Catholic
faith, which… is a principle of exegesis. Here we gain a new insight into the
identification of sacra scriptura and theologia. Only Scripture
as it is understood in faith is truly Holy Scripture. Consequently, Scripture
in the full sense is theology, i.e. it is the book and the understanding
of the book in the faith of the church. On the other hand, theology can be
called Scripture, for it is nothing other than the understanding of Scripture;
this understanding, which is theology, brings Scripture to that full
fruitfulness which corresponds to its nature as revelation…. In the light of
this, it should be obvious enough what a difference lies between Bonaventure’s
view and any actualistic misinterpretation of it. We can express this
difference as follows. The understanding which elevates the Scripture to the
status of ‘revelation’ is not to be taken as an affair of the individual
reader; but is realized only in the living understanding of Scripture in the
Church. In this way the objectivity of the claim of faith is affirmed without
any doubt. If we keep this in mind, we can say that without detriment to the
objectivity of the faith, the true meaning of Scripture will be found only by
reaching behind t he letters. Consequently, the true understanding of
revelation demands of each individual reader an attitude which goes beyond the
merely ‘objective’ recognition of what is written. In the deepest sense, that
understanding can be called mystical to distinguish it from all natural
knowledge. In other words, such an understanding demands the attitude of faith
by which man gains entrance into the living understanding of Scripture in the
Church. It is in this way that man truly receives ‘revelation.’”
But this
“going beyond the merely ‘objective’ recognition of what is written” and
reaching the “deepest sense, can be called mystical to distinguish it from all
natural knowledge,” is achieved by what Ratzinger describes in his Thesis 3 of “Behold the Pierced One.”
It is here in the prayer that is self-gift that one not only knows
conceptually, but experientially, the Person-Subjectivity-“I,” of the Revealer Jesus
Christ: “In Thesis 1 we saw that prayer was the central act of the person of
Jesus and, indeed, that this person is constituted by the act of prayer, of
unbroken communication with the one he calls ‘Father.’ If this is the case, it is
only possible really to understand this person by entering into this act of
prayer, by participating in it. This is suggested by Jesus’ saying that no one
can come to him unless the Father draws him (Jn. 6, 44). Where there is no
Father there is no Son. Where there is no relationship with God, there can be
no understanding of him who, in his innermost self, is nothing but relationship
with God, the Father… Therefore a participation in the mind of Jesus, i.e., in
his prayer, which j(as we have seen) is an act of love, of self-giving, which
(as we have seen) is an act of love, of self-giving and self-expropriation to
men, is not some kind of pious supplement to reading the Gospels, adding
nothing to knowledge of him or even being an obstacle to the rigorous purity of
critical knowing. On the contrary, it is the basic precondition if real
understanding, in the sense of modern hermeneutics – i.e., the entering-in to
the same time and the same meaning – is to take place.”
Now,
clearly, this prayer is an experience of the subjective “I” of the whole
person. It is the personalization of faith, without which faith would not be
completely faith. It is a lighting-up of the being of the “I” of the believer.
It is the key to the relation of faith and reason, for reason would not be illuminated
to the fullness of Being that the “I” of the believer discloses in its
transfiguration of the self-transcendence. There is no distorting medium
(sensible percept nor concept) between the praying believer and reason. Notice:
as the Person of Christ was transfigured as radiant light and energy “as he
prayed” (Lk. 9, 28), so also the reason of the believer is suffused with the
light of the being of the subject of the believer in his act of prayer. I would
suggest that this is the context to understand the remark of John Paul II in
#83 of “Fides et Ratio:” “In a special way, the person constitutes a
privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical
enquiry.”
Experience
The
epistemological starting point for the Enlightenment was to take the “I,” the
“res cogitans,” the phenomenon of consciousness as self-justified given and to
proceed deductively or inductively from there. The immediate and necessary
consequence of that was the bifurcation of “reality” into a dualism of thought
and empirical thing. The notion of experience did not surface. This was
understandable. It had never surfaced before since - outside of Augustine’s
Confessions - there was no attention focused on subjectivity as a horizon to be
considered in itself in the ancient and mediaeval world. The entire history of thought has been
classified by John Courtney Murray and Bernard Lonergan in terms of
“classicism.” Murray
remarked that “classicism designates a view of truth which holds objective truth,
precisely because it is objective, to exist `already out there now” (to use
Bernard Lonergan’s descriptive phrase). Therefore, it also exists apart from
its possession by anyone. In addition, it exists apart from history, formulated
in propositions that are verbally immutable.”
It is only within the context of the “recovery” of the “I” as reality prior to
objectification by reflective, conceptual knowing that the notion of experience
as “contact” with reality becomes meaningful.
Joseph
Pieper opens a short entry on “Experience” with the observation that “experience
is knowledge coming from direct contact with reality.”
Wojtyla makes the same point but textured philosophically: “the fundamental meaning of
experience must be firmly rooted not only in psychology but also in
anthropology as a whole. In order to grasp this meaning, we must emphasize two
elements of it that are in some way constitutive… The first element of
experience can be defined as a ‘sense of reality,’ placing the accent on reality
– on the fact that something exists with an existence that is real and
objectively independent of the cognizing subject and the subject’s cognitive
act, while at the same time existing as the object of that act. Because of
this, the structural whole of experience also contains a second element, which
can be defined as a ‘sense of knowing.’”
In a word, experience is a knowledge either of sense or reason based on the
real, which we take ultimately to be being. And it is the most basic and
foundational. Wojtyla remarks on this: “Experience is always the first and most
basic stage of human cognition, and this experience, in keeping with the dual
structure of the cognizing subject, contains not only a sensory but also an
intellectual element. For this reason, one could say that human experience is
already always a kind of understanding. It is thus also the origin of the whole
process of understanding, which develops in ways proper to itself, but always
in relation to this first stage, namely, experience. Otherwise I see no possibility
of a consistent realism in philosophy and science.”
Modernism
Experience becomes a problematic
word particularly in the period of 19th century “Modernism” that
located revelation as immanentized in the subjectivity of the believer, which
in turn reduced immutable doctrine (conceptual dogma) to historical and
psychological development. Murray
had the following to say: historical consciousness, while holding fast
to the nature of truth as objective, is concerned with the possession of truth,
with man’s affirmations of truth… The Church in the 19th century,
and even in the 20th, opposed this movement toward historical
consciousness. Here, too, the reason was obvious. The term of the historical
movement was modernism, that `conglomeration of all heresies,’ as Pascendi
dominici gregis called it. The insight into the historicity of truth and the
insight into the role of the subject in the possession of truth were
systematically exploited to produce almost every kind of pernicious `ism,’ unto
the destruction of the notion of truth itself – its objective character, its
universality, its absoluteness. These systematizations were false, but the
insights from which they issued were valid. Here again a work of discernment
needed to be done, and was not done. To be quite summary about it, this work
had to wait until Vatican Council II.”
This remark
is important and nuanced. Murray
is taking about Modernism as a false systematization but true as insight. Let
us consider what the modernists, and concretely George Tyrrell, mean by
“experience. In an unpublished lecture entitled “Revelation and Experience”
reported by Allesandro Maggiolini, we find
“Tyrrell, referring to
revelation, suggests the need to clarify whether this revelation consists ‘in certain divine
statements, or in certain spiritual experiences about which man makes statements that may be inspired by
those divine experiences, yet are not divine but human statements’ (RE, 130).
In the same context, Tyrrell observes that we must ask how revelation occurs: ‘By
way of statements, or by way of experience?.... Does God, disguise himself as
one who thinks in human categories and speaks in human words; or has he some
proper and natural mode of communication, some way of affecting the soul,
moving the will, kindling the heart, that reveals him as the sun is revealed by
its heat and brightness?’ (RE, 131-32). The work of expressing revelation in
statements falls to the "plain man," to "common sense,"
and, therefore, to Scholasticism, which ‘is just a philosophy of common sense’
(RE, 133). On closer inspection, however, Scholasticism turns out to be
radically deficient. Tyrrell's well-crafted examination of Scholasticism seems
to give particular prominence to two motifs. The first is the
incommensurability of human words and thoughts, indeed of everything human,
with the reality of God, hence, their incapacity to reveal God as he is.
Refusing to acknowledge this incapacity, Neo-scholasticism strives to
understand the primordial form of revelation propositionally. But the only
result of this effort is an infinite regress from proposition to proposition. ‘Altogether,’
concludes Tyrrell, ‘I do not think that the idea of a divine statement directly
addressed to the prophet's intellect is quite coherent or thinkable. Such a
statement needs a supplementary revelation as to its divine origin and content,
and this supplementary revelation cannot be a statement without raising the
same problem" (RE, 135). It becomes necessary to break the circle by
conceiving of the primordial
revelation as an experience. The second principal motif of Tyrrell's critique
has to do with the absolute character that propositions would have if they were
understood as a ‘direct revelation’ of God. For Tyrrell, this absoluteness is
problematic, indeed, ‘untenable.’ ‘Divine truth I still think is revealed to us
not as a statement but as a thing—just as beauty or love is revealed to us. We
may utter it in statements or receive it through a statement, but what we
apprehend is not a statement but an experience’ (RE, 138).”
Ultimately, Maggiolini goes on,
Tyrrell “interprets revelation as an ‘interior’ and personal experience to
which every ‘exterior’ factor, whether historical or theological, is
subordinate. ‘In other words, the teaching from outside must evoke a revelation
in ourselves. The prophet’s experience must become experience for us. It is to
this evoked revelation that we answered by the act of faith, recognizing it as
God’s word in us and to us. Were it not already written in the depths of our
being, where the spirit is rooted in God, we could not recognize it.’
Therefore, ‘without personal revelation, there can be no faith, nothing more
than theological or historical assent. Revelation cannot be put into us from
outside. It can be occasioned, but it cannot be caused, by instruction.’”
The heart of
Tyrrell’s Modernism instantiates the overview of Pascendi’s general take on
Modernist notion of experience: “religious
immanence.” Critiquing this, Pius X’s Pascendi
states that “the first actuation… of every vital phenomenon – and religion (…)
belongs to this category – is due to a certain need or impulsion; but speaking
more particularly of life, it has its origin in a movement of the heart, which
movement is called a sense. Therefore, as God is the object of religion, we
must conclude that faith, which is the basis and foundation of all religion,
must consist in a certain interior sense, originating in a need of the divine.
This need of the divine, which is experienced only in special and favorable
circumstances, cannot of itself appertain to the domain of consciousness, but
is first latent beneath consciousness, or, to borrow a term from modern
philosophy, in the sub-consciousness, where also its root lies hidden and
undetected” (emphasis mine).
The
“Adequate” Response to Modernism
John Courtney Murray had affirmed
that historical consciousness had overtaken “classicism” without giving up
absolute truth but finding it in the self-experience and consciousness of the
ontological subject. Classicism was not jettisoned but incorporated within this
larger epistemological method which gave it context and meaning. He went on to
affirm, however, that “The Church in the 19th century,
and even in the 20th, opposed this movement toward historical consciousness.
Here, too, the reason was obvious. The term of the historical movement was
modernism, that `conglomeration of all heresies,’ as Pascendi dominici gregis
called it. The insight into the historicity of truth and the insight into the
role of the subject in the possession of truth were systematically exploited to
produce almost every kind of pernicious `ism,’ unto the destruction of the
notion of truth itself – its objective character, its universality, its
absoluteness. These systematizations were false, but the insights from which
they issued were valid. Here again a work of discernment needed to be done, and
was not done. To be quite summary about it, this work had to wait until Vatican Council II.
The Meaning of Revelation and Faith in
Joseph Ratzinger
Michael
Schmaus had accused Joseph Ratzinger of Modernism. The latter comments: “At
that moment… the burning question was the habilitation thesis, and
Michael Schmaus, who had perhaps also heard annoying rumors from some in
Freising concerning the modernity of my theology, saw in these theses a not at
all faithful rendering of Bonaventure’s thought (however, to this day I still
affirm the contrary) but a dangerous modernism that had to lead to the
subjectivization of the concept of revelation.”
Ratzinger, interpreting Bonaventure, was clearly identifying revelation as
taking place in the subjectivity of
the believer in that the Revealer and the believer became similar (“like”) as
self-gift. They experience in themselves a similar (as much as can be expected
between uncreated Person and created) act of self-giving such that the
“oneness” that is knowing can take place. The likeness to Christ as
relation/self-gift was freely activated in the believer by the moral act of
self-mastery that makes self-gift possible. Cor
ad Cor loquitur. In a word, Ratzinger, as well as Bonaventure, was talking
about an ontological subject entering into the total self-gift of prayer. The
believing subject must experience in himself what the Revealer experiences in
Himself.
In a
keynote address on conscience and truth, Ratzinger grounds the awareness of
good and evil in an empirical ontological experience within. Transcending the negativity of Enlightenment empiricism
that denies the derivation of ought from is, as well as the Kantian idealist
consignment of moral value to ontological bereft categories of the practical intellect,
Ratzinger crafts his own terminology of “anamnesis” as the recall of moral
value from the experience of an “ontological tendency.” This ontological
tendency is an experience that is hidden beneath the consciousness of “good”
and “evil” that is causing it. As Pieper and Wojtyla remark, there is no
experience that is not realist, and by realism we mean contact with being. And
the being that we are talking about is the being of the person as subject,
about which John Paul II remarked in “Fides
et ratio” #83: “In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the
encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry.”
Nevertheless, this internal
experience and concomitant consciousness that precedes conceptual revelation
from without looks very much like the modernism of George Tyrrell seen above
where he says that “the teaching from outside must evoke a revelation in ourselves. The
prophet’s experience must become experience for us. It is to this evoked
revelation that we answered by the act of faith, recognizing it as God’s word
in us and to us. Were it not already written in the depths of our being, where
the spirit is rooted in God, we could not recognize it.” This statement could be an orthodox account of
what will be presented below were it not for the fact that it terminates in the
heresy of “vital (religious) immanence” which, being so close to the truth,
becomes “the synthesis of all heresies.” Murray
remarked: “These systematizations [Tyrrell, Loisy, etc.] were
false, but the insights from which they issued were valid. Here again a work of
discernment needed to be done, and was not done. To be quite summary about it,
this work had to wait until Vatican Council
II.”
A Suggestion for Discernment Between Ratzinger and Modernism
Ratzinger is talking about the
experience of being; Tyrrell uses the word “experience” but misuses it since he
does not understand it as contact with reality. He is talking about thought.
John Henry Newman and Joseph
Ratzinger would agree that there is something inside us that has been implanted
there by God in the moment of our creation in the image and likeness of the
divine Persons. It is an ontological implant, and as tendency, relational. In a
letter responding to the Duke of Norfolk, Newman remarked: “Certainly, if I am obliged to
bring religion into afterdinner toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the
thing), I shall drink – to the Pope, if you please, - still, to conscience
first and to the Pope afterwards.” What is implanted in our very being by
the Creator in the moment of creation is a yearning for the Absolute. It is a being-based
yearning which reaches out for the supernatural
since we do not experience in the sensible world the answer to that
yearning. The Person of the Redeemer, as an individual man, stands before us and
announces Himself to be (1) the “I Am”
(Jn. 8, 24, 28, 58) first announced in Exodus 3, 14, and (2) “the Way, and the
Truth, and the Life” (Jn. 14, 6). The response to that personal Absolute
produces a “like” divinization in the believer as “alter Christus” that becomes
an internal experience, and a consciousness that enables the believer to know
and to say: “You are the Christ, the Son of the living God” (Mt. 16, 15), which
in turn puts him in possession of eternal life (Jn. 17, 3).
The pope, then, does not impose but
proposes to the yearning and the freedom that alone can respond. Man is not a
stimulus-response organism but a free self-determining being, the
only earthly being God has willed for itself (Gaudium et spes #24). This
“only earthly being God has willed for
itself” means that the human person is autonomous (better: “theonomous”
since there is no autonomy without creation and grace) as self-determining. He
is not driven blindly by natural necessity but must propose truth and goals to
himself for himself. But these truths are present to him in conscience, not as
a set of retrievable concepts and ready-made principles, but as a consciousness
that we call “conscience.” Ratzinger first quotes from St. Basil who says, “The
love of God is not founded on a discipline imposed on us from outside, but is
constitutively established in us as the capacity and necessity of our
rational nature.”
Ratzinger then explains:
“This
means that the first so-called ontological level of the phenomenon conscience
consists in the fact that something like an original memory of the good and
true (both are identical) has been implanted in us, that there is an inner
ontological tendency within man, who is created in the likeness of God, toward
the divine. From its origin, man’s being resonates with some things and clashes
with others. This anamnesis of the origin, which results from the godlike
constitution of our being is not a conceptually articulated knowing, a store of
retrievable contents. It is, so to speak, an inner sense, a capacity to recall,
so that the one whom it addresses, if he is not turned in on himself, hears its
echo from within. He sees: That’s it! That is what my nature points to and
seeks.”
Ratzinger is pointing to the
internal – “immanent” if you will – experience in the human person as a result
of the ontological tending to the divine by its original metaphysical
architecture. This to say that the being of man appears to be constitutively
relational to God. The orientation to the divine is ontological, and therefore
“natural.” The “supernatural” will consists not in the orientation and tendency
to the divine, but the actualization of the relationality as self-gift that is
stimulated by the love from God that is grace.
Corresponding to the tendency from
within, there is the revelation from without that is not a merit of ours. It is
a Love, a grace. Ratzinger affirms: “Faith is not a merit of mine; it is not the
fruit of the depth of my interior journey, but an anticipation given by God to
our poverty. To believe is to submit to divine sovereignty, an insertion into
the common measure of the Word of God. An arrogant faith would be a
contradiction, would seem an absolutizing of one’s own doctrine, whereas faith is
actually a stripping of oneself and communion with Jesus Christ, the Son of
God, who made himself the servant of God and our servant.”
In contrast to Modernism, the
poverty of the human person needs the exterior revelation to fulfill
himself/herself as person. It can’t be demanded as a right of nature but a
yearning from the poverty of the created image. When it is given, like love it
is given freely. The exterior revelation is not simply an “occasion” for the
workings of the essential inner dynamic. As Ratzinger says it, “The
anamnesis instilled in our being needs, one might say, assistance from without
so that it can become aware of itself. But this ‘from without’ is not something
set in opposition to anamnesis but ordered to it. It has a maieutic function,
imposes nothing foreign, but brings to fruition what is proper to anamnesis,
namely, its interior openness to the truth.”
This is the reason why Newman’s toast to conscience must precede the toast to
the pope. There would not be a pope if there were no conscience needing the
elucidation from without as to what man must do to achieve that he most wants:
eternal life. Man is urgently seeking the absolute in a world culture dominated
by relativistic and positivistic activism.
Ratzinger concludes his thought by remarking that “the anamnesis of the creator
extends from within us outward toward the redeemer, and how everyone may see
him as redeemer, because he answers our own innermost expectations.”
Conclusion
There is a residual difficulty to
understand Benedict XVI as there was to understand John Paul II. It consists in
replacing one kind of theological imagination for another. The Kingdom of
heaven and the Kingdom
of God has been
understood “up there,” the Judgment is “at the end of time,” and the important
part of men is their souls, not their bodies.
There is reluctance to reach the core of the mind of
Benedict as there was also with regard to the mind of John Paul II. Pace the
philosophical difficulty of reading John Paul II and the mystical and
apparently much simpler depths of Benedict XVI, the real difficulty is the fact
that we are not dealing with essences, definitions and principles to be
abstracted into conceptual categories. We are always dealing with the
mysteriousness of the divine Persons and the person of man.
The great crisis of our times is man’s unhappiness. He has
pleasures, but he does not have joy. Joy is the result of fulfilling oneself as
being and as person. Experientially, only love gives joy.
Since God
has revealed Himself to be Love, man must know God in order to know Love. But
it turns out that the only way to know love is to love, and therefore, the only
way to know God is be God.
This is the
task of Benedict XVI. To move the Church from an epistemology of facts and
concepts in which we are culturally enmeshed, to an epistemology of the
experience of Love so as to know Him Who is Love. As he says at the end of his “New Evangelization,” “If
we take the Christian message into well-thought-out consideration, we are not speaking
about a whole lot of things. In reality, the Christian message is very simple:
We speak about God and man, and this way we say everything.”
I offer the conclusion of my paper “The Person as
Resonating Existential:” “My effort
consists in proposing a metaphysical solution for the phenomenological
description of self-determination. This proposal consists in seeing substance
and relation as two resonating dimensions manifesting a deeper core, a kind of
Heisenberg constant, which is the act of existence itself [the thomistic intensive esse]. As an act of existence, the
person would be unconceptualizable, not as lacking intelligibility but as a
superfluity of it, while yet manifesting facets variously, now as act, now as
growing (or diminishing) structure in a resonating mutual causality. Since all
ethical and social structure flows from what we understand person to be, the
ramifications of such a proposal as offered above are many and deep. Such a
notion represents a task to be achieved, a project for the next millennium;”
Robert A. Connor, “The Person as Resonating Existential,” American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. LXVI, No. 1 (1992) 39-56.
