Monday, July 30, 2012

Archbishop Bruno Forte: "The New Evangelization: A Challenge and a Promise"

[emphasis from the blogger]

When I announced that I wished to institute a Dicastery for the promotion of the New evangelisation, I opened the way for a reflection to begin on a subject I had pondered over for a long time: the need to offer a specific response to a moment of crisis in Christian life which is occurring in many countries, especially those of ancient Christian tradition.'.

The Pope shows how the realisation of a widespread crisis-particularly noticeable in 'old' Christian Countries-underlies the urgency of a new evangelisation. What, then, is this crisis? What are its causes? To face these questions is to begin planning for the new evangelisation.

In the Apostolic Letter, Ubicumque et semper, September 21, 2010, establishing the Pontifical Council for Promoting the New Evangelisation, Benedict XVI describes the crisis referred to: 'In the course of history, the mission [of the Church] has taken on new forms and employed new strategies according to different places, situations, and historical periods. In our own time, it has been particularly challenged by an abandonment of the faith - a phenomenon progressively more manifest in societies and cultures which for centuries seemed to be permeated by the Gospel ... There has been a troubling loss of the sense of the sacred, which has even called into question foundations once deemed unshakeable such as faith in a provident creator God, the revelation of Jesus Christ as the one Saviour, and a common understanding of basic human experiences: i.e., birth, death, life in a family, and reference to a natural moral law'.

In the Apostolic Letter Porta fidei (11 October 2011) introducing the Year of Faith on the 50th anniversary of the opening of the Second Vatican Council, the Pope observes with the same sincerity: 'Whereas in the past it was possible to recognise a unitary cultural matrix, broadly accepted in its appeal to the content of the faith and the values inspired by it, today this no longer seems to be the case in large swathes of society, because of a profound crisis of faith that has affected many people' (n. 2).

The crisis is deep-rooted: culturally speaking, its origin could be identified in society's progress to autonomy which began in the Age of Enlightenment [And therefore, the need now for a correct interpretation of the meaning of "Secularity" as opposed to "Secularism"]. This has now developed into the various forms of modern ideology regarding the autonomy of the human being in history. The claim is that every human person, especially in ethical matters, is absolute. The transcendent is denied and the individual 'ego' is alone.

Such an isolated person easily falls prey to the power of ideologies. When there is no connection to the Transcendent, humanity is vulnerable to oppression. The only way of escape is to open our eyes to understand the truth about ourselves, and to break out of our crippling egotistic individualism. We need to look beyond ourselves to see the truth of things, to face the reality of the Other whether this be close and immediate or transcendent and supreme. If modern ideology believes God to be 'dead, useless and unnecessary', (mortuus, inutilis, otiosus), any resolutely objective view of reality recognises the fundamental value of anchoring life and history in a source of meaning. Both the popularisation of scientific positivism and ideological absolutism took the death of God for granted-as it is clear in recent writers such as Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Michel Onfray, Piergiorgio Odifreddi. However, the parabola of modern ideologies underlines the crisis of human being left to himself. The need to be connected with the living God reawakens a kind of 'Longing for the Totally Other'
(Max Horkheimer - Th. W. Adorno). There soon follows, 'an awareness that an interior desert results whenever the human being, wishing to be the sole architect of his nature and destiny, finds himself deprived of that which is the very foundation of all things' (Ubicumque et semper).

The 'post-modern' side of this crisis turns into a denial of any ideological standpoint as [because it is] totalitarian and violent. Typically, ideologies force the post-modern man to live on fragments: as a period of contamination (everything is contaminated, nothing is worthy) and fruition (it is better to live intensely, enjoying pleasures), the post-modern era turns out to be an era of frustration, a long good-bye to any sense of security (Gianni Vattimo).

Religion is also compared with ideologies, and, therefore, is rejected because of its prejudices. It becomes necessary, then, to clarify the character of the God of Christian faith as totally unlike the totalitarian violence of ideological reason: a God who decided to choose the abandonment of the Cross to show the world the depth of his endless love. Moreover, the denial of the possibility of universal outlook pushes many post-modern people to withdraw into themselves. A return to this kind of produces in fact a 'crowd of loners'. The force of Christian charity must be commended as a remedy for loneliness and as a way of creating points of contact and solidarity with others.
Christianity sees the whole in fragments as when the Son who had been abandoned on the Cross is then resurrected to new life. Seeing 'the whole in a fragment' can be considered another name for 'beauty'. It is important, therefore, in the post-modern era that Christianity show itself as the disclosure of a humble, yet saving beauty-in the most beautiful realisation of our humanity, in the resurrection of the Crucified.

The cultural movements referred to produce ethical consequences. The scattered islands created by the post-modern fragmentation turns others into 'moral strangers' whom we must be wary of. This defines the so-called 'liquid modernity', which has been often described by the British sociologist and philosopher of Jewish-Polish origins, Zygmunt Bauman. Nowadays, there are no 'given' nor 'axiomatic' models and patterns: there are simply too many conflicting instances so that all of them end by losing their force authority. Since there are no absolute points of reference, everything can be justified in terms of the current fashion. Ethical standards, given to the Western World through the Bible, now appear weakened, concealed and hardly evident.

The terms used are 'relativism', 'nihilism' and 'weak thought'. This fluid side of post-modernity can be particularly traced to the weakness of certainties promised by the 'virtual economy', which is increasingly distant from the real economy. Once the mask of maximum profit with minimum risk is gone, what is left is the rubble of an economic and financial situation which is unstable at all levels. Finding points of reference and reliable guidelines is an immense challenge for governments and regulators. As Benedict XVI highlighted in the Caritas in veritate Encyclical, even the economy looks for salvation by knocking at the door of ethics!

2. What does the 'New'Evangelisation mean?
Faced with this Western cultural context which has so affected human life, the challenge for believers in Christ is that of preaching the Gospel of Jesus to this world in a credible fashion. On May 30 2001, Benedict XVI stated in his speech that: 'The term, ‘New evangelisation' recalls the need for a renewed manner of proclamation, especially for those who live in a context, like the one today, in which the development of secularisation has had a heavy impact, even in traditionally Christian countries. The Gospel is the ever new proclamation of the salvation worked by Christ which makes humanity participate in the mystery of God and in his life of love and opens it to a future of strong, sure hope. Highlighting that at this moment in history, the Church is called to carry out a new evangelisation, by intensifying her missionary action so that it fully corresponds to the Lord's mandate'.

What changes is not the Gospel, but those to whom it is preached. It is therefore essential to be ready to accept new challenges, to learn new languages, and to try new approaches. The Pope insists: 'The new evangelisation must try to find ways of making the proclamation of salvation more effective; a proclamation without which personal existence remains contradictory and deprived of what is essential. Even for those who remain tied to their Christian roots, but who live the difficult relationship with modernity, it is important to realise that being Christian is not a type of clothing to wear in private or on special occasions, but is something living and all-encompassing, able to contain all that is good in modern life'.

At the basis of these new approaches, there is always the new experience of contact with the living Christ for those who believe: 'Being Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the encounter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction' (Deus caritas est, 1). In this sense, the adjective 'new' used for the term 'Evangelisation' needs to be clear: it is not a new idea, as if what has been done up to this point is wrong or incomplete, and as if a new proclamation of the Gospel to the world is starting now. Similarly, it would be misleading to forget that the past can show extraordinary examples of movements of renewal and reform in periods of great pastoral and missionary creativity. Take for example the missionary involvements of modern age that have spread the Gospel to so many different cultures throughout the world. New evangelisation needs to have a genuinely 'new' quality-in the Greek terms from the New Testament, what is meant to be kainós, that is, possessing the inexhaustible ultimate and eschatological newness of the Gospel, and not simply neós, not simply a newness occurring in the course of time. It is not by chance that Jesus calls his new commandment kainé: The entolé kainé (1 John 2:7s) means that only those who share in the newness of God's communication in the Son, can live the new love he asks for and be credible witnesses to it.

Evangelisation will be 'new' if it springs from a deep commitment to renew and reform the whole Church and in all its members. Indeed, the grace of Evangelisation does not belong only to the origins of the Christian faith. The source of this grace is not exhausted, but - as St Augustine affirms, 'this fount is revealed when it flows, not when it ceases to pour out. And it was in this way that the grace, through the Apostles, reached others too, who were invited to proclaim the Gospel... indeed, it has continued to be a call right up to these days for the entire body of his Only Begotten Son, that is, his Church spread throughout the earth' (cf. Sermon, 239, 1).

Benedict XVI, quoting these words of St Augustine, says: 'The grace of the mission continually needs new evangelizers capable of receiving it so that the salvific news of the Word of God never fails to be proclaimed in the changing conditions of history' (30 May 2011). It is, then, justifiable to refer to models from the past, and to think, for example, that 'new evangelisation' is to the Second Vatican Council what the great Catholic Reform was to the Council of Trent. What the Spirit tells the Church through these great Councils is to be translated into the new life of Christians. It must find expression in new enthusiasm based on contact with the risen Christ. This is a continuing possibility for the Church, to provide credible witness to others out of lives transformed through discipleship to Jesus.

The summons to 'New evangelisation' includes what increasingly characterises this pontificate, namely, commitment to reform the Church - beginning from within with the Christianisation of hearts. The Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger of former days had already showed his distress regarding what he perceived as 'grime' of the Church. As Pope, he has intervened with honesty and determination for the sake of purifying the Ecclesial Community. Of course, evil cannot be eradicated either by wiping the slate clean or, even worse, by ignoring it. The renewal of ecclesial life, according to the young professor and future Pope Benedict XVI 'does not consist of a quantity of exercises and external institutions, but in belonging, singly and entirely, to Jesus Christ...Renewal is simplification. Not in the sense of cutting down or diminishing, but in the sense of becoming simple, turning to that true simplicity that is an echo of our Lord's simplicity. Becoming simple in this sense is what would be the real renewal for Christians, for everyone and for the Church itself' (Il nuovo popolo di Dio, Queriniana, Brescia 1971, 301. 303).

Real reform is evangelical metanoia, a radical change of heart, the only reform that can bring the Church back to its original beauty and to be sign for the nations. Renewal and reform of the Church go hand in hand: they depend on each other.

3. How to promote the 'New evangelisation'?
How shall we proclaim the Gospel of our Faith in situations so different from the Christian past? Benedict XVI, addressing the participants in the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council for Promoting the New Evangelisation (30 May 2011), says: 'The current crisis - brings with it traces of the exclusion of God from people's lives, from a generalized indifference towards the Christian faith to an attempt to marginalize it from public life. In the past decades, it was still possible to find a general Christian sensibility which unified the common experience of entire generations raised in the shadow of the faith which had shaped culture. Today, unfortunately, we are witnessing a drama of fragmentation which no longer acknowledges a unifying reference point; moreover, it often occurs that people wish to belong to the Church, but they are strongly shaped by a vision of life which is in contrast with the faith'.

There are two crucial guidelines: First, the renewal of the standard pastoral life, which aims to take advantage of all opportunities to demonstrate the freshness of the Gospel. Second, creativity and courage in adopting new initiatives of evangelisation. Both these are needed if we are to communicate the attractiveness and beauty of Christ. In the wake of totalitarian influences and the post-modern fragmentation that has occurred, it is now more urgent than ever to propose to people today 'the whole in the fragment', that is, the beauty that saves, the Gospel of the good and beautiful shepherd, Jesus (cf. John 10:11).

Christian tradition shows how this beauty can be experienced through worshipping and listening to the word of God, in liturgy, in communion and in charity. In this way, the beauty of Christ attracts and changes us, both in traditional and in new forms, and so enables us to proclaim in a credible fashion this beauty to others. According to Joseph Ratzinger – a few weeks before he became Pope, 'What we most need at this moment of history are people who make God visible in this world through their enlightened and living faith. The negative witness of Christians, who speak of God but live against him, have obscured his image and opened the door to unbelief. We need people who have their eyes fixed directly on God, and who learn from him what true humanity is. We need people whose minds have been enlightened by the light of God and whose hearts have been opened by God, so that their minds can speak to minds of others and their hearts can open others' hearts. God comes back to us only through those who are touched by God' (Subiaco, 1 April 2005).

Such kind of believers have expressed themselves in history and they will continue to do so through different forms of beauty, in the figurative and plastic arts, in music, poetry, literature and architecture, in witness of faith and charity. These are all possible channels of communication with God. Beauty is for everyone, and no one is excluded from its gift; and, in particular, the poor are most deserving of it. One field in which the beauty of Jesus Christ needs to be proclaimed is the standard pastoral life: the celebration of the fundamental stages of life with the sacraments is a choice for what is truly of value, for it underscores the central proclamation of faith, the kérygma of the Resurrection of the Crucified. It is important, therefore, to put significant effort into the catechesis, both for children and adults. Likewise, there is the preaching of sermons - which are still too often under-prepared and long-winded - and the special occasions of holy days and pilgrimages, the celebration of sacraments and the meditation of the word of God (lectio divina), spiritual exercises for everyone, etc.)

A particular occasion of New evangelisation is represented by marriage preparation courses, which are often addressed to couples who have not frequented the Sacraments for a long time or who are already living together. At the same time, taking care of families, especially young people, is an effective exercise of permanent Evangelisation. Religious education in schools, in spite of the fact that it has a predominantly cultural and informative purpose, can be a precious means of Evangelisation if it is informed by the teachers' own meaningful experience. Thanks to all these forms and the daily testimony of parents and educators in particular, Christ will appear to modern men and women and especially to young people, not only as truth, which he is, not only as good, which he is and inspires in us, but also as a beauty that can save. In him is revealed the Whole of eternal love which is given into the fragments of our existence as it is touched by grace.

But there also new perspectives for Evangelisation. There is one issue of interest to all Christian communities, and, more generally, for societies affected by the great cultural changes of recent decades. I am referring to the 'educational challenge' which for instance Italian Bishops have chosen to focus on for the coming years. The reason for making education a focal area in the New evangelisation seems clear once we consider how difficult it is to convey our values to the younger generation. It seems like the gap between generations has widened all of a sudden, due both to the rapid rate of change and the new languages the computer and the Internet. 'Digital natives' were born during the Internet era and are at ease in accessing it. They have difficulties interacting with the inhabitants of the old planet Earth, defined as it is by borders and distances. Well-intentioned instruction on the part of parents and educators can be negated by the Internet world. There, the young people surf the web for long periods, and often without caution and discretion.
Whilst the 'global world' of the young is more and more standardised on a planetary scale, national identities are rooted in history, use and customs; and there are of only relative interest to youthful eyes.

We have to acknowledge that pastoral work seems to answer questions that no one is asking, or ask questions that no one cares about. We often feel that we are living in a world without God. That may be the result of thinking of 'God without a world'. That may be the case for many people we want to reach, who speak languages that are completely different from ours. Our love for young people, which is the reason why we want to pass on the best we have in our hearts, seems to struggle to find the right form of communication.

How can we face this challenge? How can we express what we really care about to new generations? Looking for an answer to these questions seems at the heart of commitment to the New evangelisation. Let us meditate on the Biblical story of the disciples on the way to Emmaus. Jesus approaches them on their journey, and draws them into to the complete reality of his mystery (Luke 24:13-35). The way in which the Son of God educates the two disciples who are so similar to us and to the young, we who are 'foolish and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken', can help us to understand how to face the radical challenge of education and living our commitment to Evangelisation.

First of all, the Emmaus story makes us understand that education, as well as Evangelisation, is a path: neither takes place in an untroubled, once and for all, closed relationship. Rather, both occur according to the risk and complexity, between nostlagia and hope, of personal development. All this is represented by the journey from Jerusalem to Emmaus taken by the two disciples and the mysterious Wayfarer. The story suggests that we have all left the City of God, because we are the work of His hands, and we go as pilgrims towards the future at dusk, needing someone to be close to us, someone we can rely on: 'Stay with us because it is getting dark and the day is almost over' (v. 29). We are all going towards the ultimate silence! It is the confrontation with the mystery of death that gives us two radical and opposite possibilities: being 'towards-death' (as Martin Heidegger suggests when reflecting on the human condition) or being 'beggars for heaven' (as Jacques Martin suggests), bound to a life of victory over the death in the heavenly Jerusalem. If man is alone in this world, the last word on his destiny could not be anything else but that of the final silence, when everything will die away. If, rather, there is a God who is love, every personal being is a singular and unique 'you' to whom this love is addressed, and who will live forever, thanks to the eternal fidelity of the love that has revealed itself.
The choice is crucial between the two options, and must be made every day. The proclamation of life victorious over death must resonate every day, in a ceaseless witness. This is lived out through sharing the journey and through the humble and courageous promotion of the Gospel of love in the widest range of forms, languages and experiences. This is precisely the 'new evangelisation' that every generation needs. The proclamation of the meaning of life must never be taken for granted; for it implies the horizon of God and His eternal love. There will always be a need for people with a new heart, who are capable of singing the new canticle of hope and faith along the often winding paths which we human beings are called to walk. Anyone who evangelizes or educates must never forget that the crucial choice at stake-this fundamental option shaping each one's life and the decisions each one will make. Educating means introducing others to the meaning of total reality through a process which helps them to see the truth and to make their own the account of life and hope proposed to them. The goal of complete education can be only the free and faithful choice of what is good in accordance with God's plans for each and all, for there lies true peace. To reach this goal-for both education and evangelisation- demands that four conditions are fulfilled:

a) The first condition necessary for the transmission of faith is the gift of time. The modern culture of progress has profoundly altered our conception of temporality. Reason, which aims to dominate all, has relentlessly accelerated the transformation of historical reality. This 'reason in a hurry' is expressed in the rapidity of technological and scientific development, as it is in ideologically driven revolutionary urgency. The myth of progress is nothing but a form of desire for reason to be in power. Modern philosophies of history not only interpret the world, but also attempt to transform it in accord with their image
and likeness – and as quickly as possible. Emancipation – modernity's inspiring theme – brings a special urgency to the task. The gap between 'historical time' and 'biological time', is ever widened by the thirst for global solutions. That is the characteristic of the cult of progress, with devastating consequences of environmental deterioration and ecological imbalance. We need now to rediscover humankind's dominion over time if we are to begin finding time for people again, in what they need for their overall development. We must have time for others and give them time, accompanying them faithfully for the duration, patiently experiencing the gift of our own time.

Who is ever in a hurry, unready to give time to others on their journey, will never be an educator, nor an evangelist. On the road to Emmaus, Jesus could have immediately revealed his secret, but did not. He knew that the two disciples needed time to understand what he was going to reveal to them. As in every relationship based on love, even in an educational relationship or in the process of Evangelisation, giving time for others is the most credible sign of genuine service.

b) A second condition for the effective transmission of faith is care for interpersonal relationships. As Romano Guardini states, 'only life ignites life'; and it is therefore only within the warmth of interpersonal relationships that education can be effectively carried out. Historical parabola of modernity represent here an obstacle, because the general breakdown of ideologies and the strong allegiances they nourished, has produced in our post-modern condition a widespread experience of incommunicability and the dominance of the so-called 'sad passions' shrouding the narrow horizon of the individual. As a result, interpersonal relationships have weakened. The 'strong culture' built on ideology has splintered into countless 'weak cultures'. A 'crowd of loners' closes everyone up in a private world. We are increasingly alone because we lack a common dream. Building bridges, therefore, between those who are alone is now of vital importance. In that regard, Evangelisation is relevant, as is educational process supportive of those sharing a common journey as they move on together. Educators and evangelizers must be with others before being for others. Education, like Evangelisation, occurs through listening, sharing and dialogue. Dialogue does not mean the quashing of differences, however: others cannot love themselves if they are not allowed to be themselves, and accepting of the inevitable differences between themselves and others. 'If you love me, you can say no to me' is an indicator of an effective educational approach, presuming that the context is a network of care and love which does not exclude differences, but allows them to meet for reciprocal challenge and enrichment.

Likewise, essential to any educational experience is communion in difference: Here, we have an example in the mysterious Wayfarer on the road to Emmaus. He draws near, joins the two travellers on their journey, listens, and changes their way of seeing things: 'Jesus Himself approached and walked along with them' (v. 15). He goes with them, asks questions, listens, reads their hearts-and makes their hearts burn within them at the proclamation of the word of life, sparking the desire, in their turn, to share what they came to feel and understand. This is what it means to transmit the meaning and the beauty of life through the eloquence of life itself. As Paul VI wrote, 'Modern people listen more willingly to witnesses than to teachers; and, when they listen to teachers, they do so because they are also witnesses' (cf. Evangelii Nuntiandi, no. 41). The one who educates, like the one who evangelizes, must draw near to the other: the light of life is transmitted by interpersonal interaction, patiently allowing to the other the time that is needed, and encouraging their choices. As John Henry Newman loved to say, cor ad cor loquitur, 'heart speaks to heart'. 'Nulla maior est ad amorem invitatio quam praevenire amando', wrote St. Augustine to a friend who asked him how to educate the difficult boys of his day (De catechizandis rudibus, 4), that is, 'There is no greater invitation to love than loving first'. Educators, like evangelists, must love first and foremost, and without tiring. Only a loving relationship is truly life-giving.

c) A third condition necessary for the transmission of faith is the ability to keep memory alive. After the strong claims of ideologies, post-modernism often arises like an 'identity crisis' arising from a kind of loss of collective and personal memory. This amnesia is the result of a mistaken emancipation from the past and from our roots. We are in an era of 'weak identities' affecting all the variety of memory in its personal, historical, national, cultural, spiritual and the linguistic forms. But the eradication of the past undermines the very possibility of addressing the challenges of the present and the future.

Without memory there is no identity – and no prophecy! In the story of the disciples of Emmaus it is significant that Jesus not only accompanies his two disciples, but also reminds them of things that have occurred, and enlightens their minds with the big picture of the history of salvation. In doing so, he rouses the two travellers by unlocking the meaning of what had been happening, touches their troubled hearts and opens their eyes to the wonder of the gift of divine love: 'Beginning with Moses and all the Prophets, he explained to them what was said in all the Scriptures concerning himself' (v. 27).

By recalling the wonders wrought by God for his people, the mysterious Wayfarer introduces these two into how own living truth, and opens up the treasure of his heart by making them understand what all have received from the heavenly Father as the gift of true life. Here we have an instance of how the language of memory shapes and inspires the identity of those with whom we communicate, so that objectivity and passion, facts and emotions come together. It is not enough to simply recall the past; its meaning needs to be teased out and applied in such a way as to address the deepest questions of our present lives. The 'new evangelisation' involves keeping alive this vital, 'dangerous' memory. It places personal existence within reality as a whole, and therefore within the living tradition of faith and love which nourish life. It radiates the light that comes from the history of salvation and opens life to the promise of the future.
In this respect, education deals with the whole person and the whole of reality- 'Catholic', in the etymological sense of the term ('kath'òlou' = ‘according to the whole'). In the embrace of all reality, life gives life, the gift received becomes the gift given in love, just as the whole truth frees and saves. Therefore, memory must be like that which Jesus evoked - living and transforming, rather than sterile and inert: 'Were not our hearts burning within us while he talked with us on the road and opened the Scriptures to us?' (v. 32). Only the honest word and the genuine witness of what we have experienced are able to inspire life. Memory must be shared lovingly with others, just like Jesus revealing himself at the end of the shared journey in the gesture of the breaking of bread, thus of offering and sharing the gift of God through the gift of himself. 'When he was at the table with them, he took bread, blessed and broke it, and gave it to them. Then their eyes were opened, and they recognised him' (vv. 30 and 31). The gesture of blessing is linked to the symbol of the sharing of the bread, of word, of life, and heart. Only in a dialogical relationship rich with memory, and eloquent in gesture, is the life which gives life, between parents and children, between educators and students, between evangelisers and the evangelised ...

d) A fourth condition for the transmitting faith both through education and Evangelisation is respect for the freedom of others-that also means encouraging them along the path of genuine liberation. In post-modern culture there is shortage of great hopes to open horizons of adult and responsible freedom. With the sun having set on ideology, the future does not appear as reliable as the great ideological narratives, of widely varying origins, wanted to represent it. When the lights have gone out it is a challenge to move forward with confidence-for both personal existence and social development. Once more, the Emmaus story offers surprising riches. For Jesus reveals a new future to the two disciples. He opens their hearts to steadfast hope and inspires prophecy, spreading the freedom of courage and of joy.

Evangelisation aims to open horizons, to rise to challenges, and to ignite passion for the cause of God in this world. Neither the evangeliser nor the educator may intend to dominate others, but to lead them to true freedom. Jesus proceeds in this way: he draws near, he explains the Scriptures, he feeds desire, he allows himself to be recognised and offers the two men the proclamation of his victory over death-but in all this, leaving them free from fear and bringing them to the freedom of the mission: 'As they talked and discussed these things with each other, Jesus approached and walked along with them ... And beginning with Moses and all the Prophets, he explained to them what was said in all the Scriptures concerning himself' (vv. 15 and 27). He stirs in the hearts of these two a 'great joy' (v. 41). Such a joy created a sense of urgency; they left immediately to take to the others the Good News which they had witnessed: 'They got up and returned at once to Jerusalem. There they found the Eleven and those with them, assembled together, and said, ‘It is true! The Lord has risen and has appeared to Simon' ' (vv. 33-34). When you witness to an encounter of this kind, there is no stopping at what you have been given. You must pass it on in turn-even if freely choosing to do so.

Evangelisation either produces witnesses who are free and convinced of what they are living-or, it fails in its goals. The evangelising educator must not create dependencies, but instigate life journeys for each and every one, thus radiating the light they have first received:. 'Then the two told what had happened on the way, and how Jesus was recognised by them when he broke the bread' (v. 35).

Education has achieved its goal when its recipients are able to spread the gift that has come to them and changed them. The same must be said of Evangelisation: to evangelise is not to produce clones, but to communicate and inspire life at its deepest, so to inspire journeys of freedom and expanding consciousness. In this way, the biblical icon of Emmaus gives us a description as much of education as of the new evangelisation: an educator and evangeliser are alike in accompanying others from a sad meaninglessness to a life of joyous significance. This path opens from the precious depth of one's own heart and leads into the heart of the Church, so that all can grow stronger in love. To be an educator means being able to repeat these words with St. Paul the Apostle: 'Not that we lord it over your faith, but we work with you for your joy' (2 Corinthians 1:24). It is to be the guardian and promoter of freedom for everyone.

A conclusion which is a beginning...
The style of Jesus can be perceived in his dealings with the disciples of Emmaus, we must then all examine ourselves, asking ourselves if, and to what extent, our commitment to the new evangelisation is similar to his way of acting-in regard to our society, our historical memory and in terms of prophetic hope for its future. This is as relevant for the vital, daily communication between generations as it is for the Church's global pastoral action in the service of the new evangelisation. We might easily feel that we are losing the battle. However, there is comfort in the fact that we are not alone. God - who has educated his people throughout the history of salvation - continues to educate us in the present: 'The Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you' (John 14:26).

The Lord is the great evangeliser, and the gift of his love is ever new. We cannot, therefore, give up either in rising to the educational challenge, or to that of the new evangelisation, no matter the cost. And we will trust in the divine Master. As Pope Benedict XVI stated in his speech of May 30 2011: 'Proclaiming Jesus Christ the only Saviour of the World today is more complex than in the past; but our task remains identical to that at the dawn of our history. The mission has not changed, just as the enthusiasm and courage that moved the Apostles and first disciples must not change. The Holy Spirit which prompted them to open the doors and made evangelisers of them (cf. Acts 2: 1-4) is the same Spirit which today moves the Church to a renewed proclamation of hope for the people of our time'.

We are not alone: the Lord Jesus travels with us in the strength of his Spirit, along with the Church, and the educating and evangelising community. The eyes of the Lord guide our steps; the ultimate goal is the beauty and peace of humanity reconciled in His love. In conclusion, I would now like to turn to Christ, telling him simply and faithfully on behalf of all those who wish to accept the challenge of the new evangelisation and of the educational commitment it inspires:

Lord Jesus, you joined the two grieving disciples on their journey as they moved from the city of God toward the darkness of evening. You made their hearts burn, opening their eyes to the total reality of Your mystery. You agreed to stop with them at the inn, to break bread at their table and allow their eyes to be opened, so that they might recognise You. You then disappeared, because they - by now touched by You - left for the streets of the world to take to all people the liberating proclamation which You had given them. Allow us also to see You by our side, a wayfarer with us on our journeys. Enlighten us and allow us to enlighten others in turn, beginning from those who particularly rely on us to be companions on their journeys too, as you did with us, in order to remind them of the wonders of salvation and to make their hearts burn, as you made our hearts burn within us, so to follow you in freedom and in joy and proclaiming your beauty and the gift of your love which triumphs over death. Amen. Alleluia.'

Sunday, July 29, 2012

The Achievement of Metaphysical Subjectivity - Threshold of the 3d Millennium

Karol Wojtyla

Person and Community

(1993) Lang


The Person: Subject and

All of the reflections I shall be presenting here refer to and are rooted in my book The Acting Person.[1] Based on the analyses in that book, I wish to reexamine the connection that exists between the subjectivity of the human person and the structure of human community. This problem was already outlined in The Acting Person, especially in the final section "Participation." Here I wish to develop that outline somewhat, beginning with the concept of person, which itself was rather extensively discussed in the book. Many of the analyses presented in The Acting Person are closely connected with the problem of the subjectivity of the human per­son; one might even say that they all in some way contribute to an un­derstanding and disclosure of this subjectivity. It would be difficult here to reproduce them in full. Certain sections could be compiled as an ap­pendix to this essay. In addition, I should also mention a discussion that took place in connection with The Acting Person at a meeting of professors of philosophy.2 Taken as a whole, the papers from that discussion con­stitute an extensive contribution to Polish philosophical anthropology; it was also with this in mind that they were subsequently published in Analecta Cracoviensia. The problem of the subjectivity of the human being is a problem of paramount philosophical importance today. Divergent tendencies contend with one another over it; their cognitive assumptions and orientations often give it a diametrically opposed form and meaning. The philosophy of consciousness would have us believe that it first discovered the human subject. The philosophy of being is prepared to demonstrate that quite the opposite is true, that in fact an analysis of pure consciousness leads inevitably to an annihilation of the subject. The need arises to find the actual point at which phenomenological analyses based on the assumptions of the philosophy of consciousness begin to work in favor of an enrich­ment of the realistic image of the person. The need also arises to authen­ticate the foundations of such a philosophy of person.

In addition, the problem of the subjectivity of the person—particularly in relation to human community—imposes itself today as one of the central ideological issues that lie at the very basis of human praxis, morality (and thus also ethics), culture, civilization, and politics. Philosophy comes into play here in its essential function: philosophy as an expression of basic understandings and ultimate justifications. The need for such under­standings and justifications always accompanies humankind in its sojourn on earth, but this need becomes especially intense in certain moments of history, namely, in moments of great crisis and confrontation. The present age is such a moment. It is a time of great controversy about the human being, controversy about the very meaning of human existence, and thus about the nature and significance of the human being. This is not the first time that Christian philosophy has been faced with a materialistic inter­pretation, but it is the first time that such an interpretation has had so many means at its disposal and has expressed itself in so many currents. This aptly describes the situation in Poland today with respect to the whole political reality that has arisen out of Marxism, out of dialectical materialism, and strives to win minds over to this ideology.

We know that such situations in history have frequently led to a deeper reflection on Christian truth as a whole, as well as on particular aspects of it. That is also the case today. The truth about the human being, in turn, has a distinctly privileged place in this whole process. After nearly twenty years of ideological debate in Poland, it has become clear that at the center of this debate is not cosmology or philosophy of nature but philosophical anthropology and ethics: the great and fundamental con­troversy about the human being.

From the point of view of Christian philosophy, and theology as well, such a turn of events (which was reflected in the entire teaching of the Second Vatican Council, especially in the constitution Gaudium et Spes) favors treating the topic of the human person from a variety of angles. (I have always to some extent taken this approach in my publications. 4) The present work also develops in accord with this principle.



In the field of experience, the human being appears both as a particular suppositum and as a concrete self, in every instance unique and un­repeatable. This is an experience of the human being in two senses simul­taneously, for the one having the experience is a human being and the one being experienced by the subject of this experience is also a human being. The human being is simultaneously its subject and object. Objec­tivity belongs to the essence of experience, for experience is always an experience of "something" or "somebody" (in this case, "somebody"). The tendency to retreat toward the "pure subjectivity" of experience is characteristic of the philosophy of consciousness, about which more will be said later. In reality, however, objectivity belongs to the essence of experience, and so the human being, who is the subject, is also given in experience in an objective way. Experience, so to speak, dispels the notion of "pure consciousness" from human knowledge, or rather it summons all that this notion has contributed to our knowledge of the human being to the dimensions of objective reality.

In experience, the human being is given to us as someone who exists and acts. I am such an existing and acting individual and so is everyone else. The experience of existing and acting is something that all human beings, both others and I, have in common; at the same time, all human beings, both others and I, are also the object of this experience. This occurs in different ways, because I experience my own self as existing and acting differently from how I experience others, and so does every other concrete self. Obviously, though, I must include both others and myself in the whole process of understanding the human being. I can proceed in this process either from others or from myself. Special attention to this self is particularly important for a full understanding of the sub­jectivity of the human being, because in no other object of the experience of the human being are the constitutive elements of this subjectivity given to me in such an immediate and evident way as in my own self.5

When I construct an image of the person as subject on the basis of the experience of the human being, I draw especially upon the experience of my own self, but never in isolation from or in opposition to others. All analyses aimed at illuminating human subjectivity have their categorical limits. We can neither go beyond those limits nor completely free ourselves from them, for they are strictly connected with the objec­tivity of experience. As soon as we begin to accept the notion of "pure consciousness" or the "pure subject," we abandon the very basis of the objectivity of the experience that allows us to understand and explain the subjectivity of the human being in a complete way—but then we are no longer interpreting the real subjectivity of the human being.

Nor are we interpreting it when we focus in a purely "phenomenal" or "symptomatic" way on individual functions or even on selective struc­tural wholes within the human being, as do the different particular sciences that examine the human being in a variety of aspects. While it cannot be denied that through the use of this method these sciences gather more and more material for understanding the human person and human sub­jectivity, they themselves do not provide this understanding. On the other hand, because they do supply us with an ever increasing body of empirical knowledge about the human being, we must constantly renew (or, as it were, "reinterpret") philosophically the essential content of our image of the human being as a person. This need also increases along with the whole wealth of phenomenological analyses, which, in the interests of the objectivity of experience, must in some way be transposed from the plane of consciousness and integrated into the full reality of the person. There can be no doubt that these analyses are especially valuable and fruitful for the entire process of understanding and explaining the subjec­tivity of the person.

This state of research on the human being, and in particular its rather well-defined and differentiated approach to the basic source of knowledge of the human being, that is, to the full and multidimensional experience of the human being, allows us to accept completely the ancient concept of suppositum and, at the same time, to understand it a new way. To say that the human being—I and every other human being—is given in ex­perience as a suppositum is to say that the whole experience of the human being, which reveals the human being to us as someone who exists and acts, both allows and legitimately requires us to conceive the human being as the subject of that existence and activity. And this is precisely what is contained in the concept of suppositum. This concept serves to express the subjectivity of the human being in the metaphysical sense. By "metaphysical," I mean not so much "beyond-the-phenomenal" as "through-the-phenomenal," or "trans-phenomenal." Through all the phenomena that in experience go to make up the whole human being as someone who exists and acts, we perceive—somehow we must perceive—the subject of that existence and activity. Or better, we perceive that the human being is – must be – that “subject.” Otherwise the whole existence and activity given to us in experience as the human being’s existence and activity (and, in the concrete case of my own self, as my existence and activity) could not be the human being’s my) existence and activity. Metaphysical subjectivity, or the suppositum, as the transphenomenal and therefore fundamental expression of the experience of the human being, is also the guarantor of the identity of this human being in existence and activity.

By saying that the suppositum is the fundamental expression of the whole experience of the human being, I mean that this expression is in some sense an inviolable one: experience cannot be detached from it, and, at the same time, that it is open to everything that the experience of the human being, especially the experience of one's own self, can bring to the understanding of the subjectivity of the person. While recognizing the special and distinct character of metaphysical knowledge, I am not willing to let it be divorced from the rest of human knowledge. After all, all knowledge is metaphysical at root, for it reaches to being; this cannot, however, obscure the significance of the particular aspects of being for understanding it in its full richness.


The discovery of the human suppositum, or human subjectivity in the metaphysical sense, also brings with it a basic understanding of the rela­tion between existence and activity. This relation is expressed in the philosophical adage: operari sequitur esse.6 Although the adage sounds as though it were referring to a unilateral relation, namely, to the causal dependence of activity on existence, it also implies yet another relation between operari and esse. If operari results from esse, then operari is also—proceeding in the opposite direction—the most proper avenue to knowledge of that esse. This is, therefore, a gnosiological dependence. From human operari, then, we discover not only that the human being is its "subject," but also who the human being is as the subject of his or her activity. operari, taken as the total dynamism of the human being, enables us to arrive at a more precise and proper understanding of the subjectivity of the human being. By subjectivity here, I am no longer referring to just the suppositum as the subject in the metaphysical sense; I am also referring to everything that, based upon this suppositum, makes the human being an individual, personal subject.

The dynamism proper to the human being is complex and differentiated. Abstracting for the moment from other differentiations, we should note that the structural whole of human dynamism (operari in the broadest sense of the term) includes everything that in some sense merely happens in the human being, along with everything that the human being does. The latter—i.e., action—is a distinct form of human operari; the human being is revealed as a person mainly in and through action. A complete analysis of human dynamism would give us a complete picture of human subjectivity. By a complete analysis, I mean an analysis not only of actions but also of everything that happens in the human being on both the somatic and the psychic level, or, more precisely, on both the somatic-reactive and the psychic-emotive level7 —for there can be no doubt that human subjectivity reflects the complexity of human nature and is, therefore, in some sense multidimensional. A deeper analysis based on the relation operari sequitur esse and carried out always within the context of the human suppositum, or metaphysical subjectivity, would help reveal the nature of both the somatic and the psychic subjectivity of the human being; in other words, such an analysis would help show how human persons are subjects through their bodies and psyches. It would be difficult not at least to mention the enormous significance of the emotions for the development of a concrete human subjectivity, i.e., for the kind of subject that a concrete human being is, namely, both an individual and a person.

I shall, however, set aside that whole line of inquiry here, for I believe that the form of human operari that has the most basic and essential significance for grasping the subjectivity of the human being is action: conscious human activity, in which the freedom proper to the human person is simultaneously expressed and concretized. Thus, remaining always within the context of the suppositum (the suppositum humanum, of course) or subjectivity in the metaphysical and fundamental sense, we can arrive at a knowledge and explanation of subjectivity in the sense proper to the human being, namely, subjectivity in the personal sense. After all, thi: metaphysical subjectivity in the sense of suppositum belongs to everything that in any way exists and acts; it belongs to different existing and acting beings according to an analogy of proportionality. We must, therefore, define more precisely the subjectivity proper to the human being, namely, personal subjectivity, taking as our basis the whole of human dynamism (operari), but especially the dynamism that may properly be called the activity of the human being as a person: the dynamism of action.

Beginning, then, with action, we cannot help but perceive that the personal subjectivity of the human being is a distinctive, rich structure, one that is brought to light by means of a comprehensive analysis of action.The human being as a person is constituted metaphysically as a being by the suppositum, and so from the very beginning the human being is some­one who exists and acts, although fully human activity Cactus humanus), or action, appears only at a certain stage of human development. This is a consequence of the complexity of human nature. The spiritual elements of cognition and consciousness, along with freedom and self-determina­tion, gradually gain mastery over the somatic and rudimentary psychic dimensions of humanity. The individual's whole development, in turn, tends clearly toward the emergence of the person and personal subjectivity in the human suppositum. In this way, somehow on the basis of this sup­positum, the human self gradually both discloses itself and constitutes itself—and it discloses itself also by constituting itself.

The self constitutes itself through action, through the operari proper to the human being as a person. It also constitutes itself through its entire psychosomatic dynamism, through the whole sphere of operari that simply happens in the subject but that nevertheless also somehow shapes the subjectivity of the individual. Of course, the human self is able to con­stitute itself in this manner only because it already is and has been con­stituted in an essential and fundamental way as a suppositum. The suppositum humanum must somehow manifest itself as a human self: metaphysical subjectivity must manifest itself as personal subjectivity.

This must is the strongest argument for the metaphysical conception of human nature. The human being is a person "by nature." The subjec­tivity proper to a person also belongs to the human being "by nature." The fact that the human suppositum, or metaphysical subjectivity, does not display the traits of personal subjectivity in certain cases (i.e., in cases of psychosomatic or purely psychological immaturity, in which either the normal human self has not developed or the self has developed in a distorted way) does not allow us to question the very foundations of this subjectivity, for they reside within the essentially human suppositum.

In what follows, I shall be considering the normally developed human self, for it is there that we find the authentic traits of the subjectivity proper to the person.


In singling out action, or human operari, as the form of human dynamism that best enables us to know the human being as a personal subject, the first thing we should note is that this action is conscious activity. In attempting to understand the subjectivity of the person by means of action, we also need to become aware of the special significance consciousness has for this subjectivity. It must be conceded that this aspect was not developed in the Scholastic tradition, where actus humanus was subjected to a detailed analysis chiefly from the side of voluntarium. Voluntarium, of course, could only occur on the basis of understanding—mainly an understanding of goods and ends—since voluntas is simply appetites intellectivus expressed in liberium arbitrium. Consciousness, however, is not the ordinary understanding that directs the will and ac­tivity. After Descartes, on the other hand, the aspect of consciousness eventually assumed a kind of absolutization, which in the contemporary era entered phenomenology by way of Husserl. The gnosiological attitude in philosophy has replaced the metaphysical attitude: being is constituted in and somehow through consciousness. The reality of the person, how­ever, demands the restoration of the notion of conscious being, a being that is not constituted in and through consciousness but that instead some­how constitutes consciousness. This also applies to the reality of action as conscious activity.

While it may be granted that the person and action—or, to put it another way, my own existing and acting self—is constituted in consciousness to the extent that consciousness always reflects the existence (esse) and ac­tivity (operari) of that self, still the experience of the human being (and especially the experience of my own self) clearly reveals that conscious­ness is always subjectified in the self and that its roots are always the suppositum humanum. Consciousness is not an independent subject, al­though by means of a certain abstraction, or rather exclusion, which in Husserlian terminology is called epoche, consciousness could be treated as though it were a subject. This way of treating consciousness forms the basis of all transcendental philosophy, which investigates acts of cognition as intentional acts of consciousness, that is, as acts directed toward extra-subjective, objective contents (phenomena). As long as this type of analysis of consciousness retains the character of a cognitive method, it can and does bear excellent fruit. And yet because this method is based on the exclusion (epoche) of consciousness from reality, from really ex­isting being, it cannot be regarded as a philosophy of that reality, and it certainly cannot be regarded as a philosophy of the human being, the human person. At the same time, however, there can be no doubt that this method should be used extensively in the philosophy of the human being.

Consciousness is not an independent subject, but it does play a key role in understanding the personal subjectivity of the human being. It is impossible to grasp and objectify the relation between the suppositum humanum and the human self without taking into consideration conscious­ness and its function. The function of consciousness is not purely cognitive in the sense that this may be said of acts of human knowledge or even self-knowledge. While I can agree with Husserl that these acts are in consciousness, it is quite another thing to say that they are proper to consciousness and correspond genetically to its proper function. Con­sciousness, insofar as it undoubtedly reflects whatever is objectified cog­nitively by the human being, at the same time and above all endows this objectified content with the subjective dimension proper to the human being as a subject. Consciousness interiorizes all that the human being cognizes, including everything that the individual cognizes from within in acts of self-knowledge, and makes it all a content of the subject's lived experience.8

Being a subject (a suppositum) and experiencing oneself as a subject occur on two entirely different dimensions. Only in the latter do we come in contact with the actual reality of the human self. Consciousness plays a key and constitutive role in the formation of this latter dimension of personal human subjectivity. One could also say that the human sup­positum becomes a human self and appears as one to itself because of consciousness. This in no way implies, however, that the human self is completely reducible to consciousness or self-consciousness. Rather, the self is constituted through the mediation of consciousness in the sup­positum humanum within the context of the whole existence (esse) and activity (operari) proper to this suppositum. This should not be understood in the sense of individual acts or moments of consciousness, which, as we know, manifests itself as dynamic as well as discontinuous and oscil­lating (we need only consider periods of sleep), and also as connected with the subconscious in various ways.

Taking all of this into consideration, we still cannot fail to recognize that human beings are subjects—and even subjects completely in actu, so to speak—only when they experience themselves as subjects. And this presupposes consciousness. Clearly in such a view the very meaning of subject and subjectivity is not only enriched but also somewhat modified. The concept of subjectivity takes on a distinctive inwardness of activity and existence—an inwardness, but also an "in-selfness." Human beings exist "in themselves," and so their activities likewise have an "in-self," or "non-transitive," dimension. This in-selfness and inwardness of human activity and existence is simply a more precise—and no less philosophi­cal—definition of what is contained virtually in the notion of suppositum humanum. To attain an image of the person as a concrete human self and, together with this, to arrive at the full meaning of personal human sub­jectivity, we must unravel this "virtualness" and explicate as fully as pos­sible what is contained in the suppositum humanum. And that is precisely what an analysis of the human being from the perspective of consciousness and lived experience will help us do.

There are those who hold the view that by such an analysis we sever ourselves from metaphysical subjectivity and enter the realm of purely psychological subjectivity. This view ultimately appeals to the experience of the human being and to a manner of methodically examining that ex­perience. It does not seem to me, however, that anything stands in the way of our analyzing the human being from the perspective of conscious­ness and lived experience so as better to understand the suppositum humanum, and especially this suppositum as a concrete and unrepeatable self, or person. After all, the reality of the person is not "extra-phenomenal," but only "trans-phenomenal." In other words, we must deep­ly and comprehensively explore the "phenomenon" of the human being in order fully to understand and objectify the human being.


Following these observations, we may now return to the form of human operari called action—conscious activity. Having considered the aspect of consciousness, which is essential for such activity, we are better prepared to understand the special connection between action and the personal subjec­tivity of the human being. Action, which in traditional terminology was called actus humanus, should really be called actus personae. The latter is a better name for action because of the element of efficacy that lies at the basis of action, for this is the efficacy of a person. A strict connection exists between a concrete human action and a particular self, a connection that has a causal and efficient character. Because of this connection, the action cannot be divorced from that self and attributed to someone else as its author. This connection is of a completely different kind from the one that occurs between the same human self and everything that merely happens in it. We attribute the action, the conscious activity, to this self as its likewise conscious author. Such efficacy involves the element of will, and therefore of freedom, which, in turn, brings with it the element of moral responsibility. And this takes us right into the essential dimension of the personal subjectivity of the human being.9

This dimension will have to be analyzed in successive stages, for it contains—and in some sense continues to accumulate—such a wealth of specifically human reality that it is impossible to examine all of its es­sential elements at once. Although an analysis of moral responsibility takes us even more deeply into the problematic of the will and of the freedom proper to the human being as a person, and thus in a certain sense makes our view of them even sharper, an analysis of personal efficacy should come first.

The concept of efficacy, though certainly grounded in the experience of the human being, is imprecise here insofar as efficacy may refer to the dependence of an external effect on a cause—an effect outside the authoring subject. Activity itself in that case has a transitive character, which, of course, is often true of human activities. Through our activity we are the authors of many effects outside ourselves; through it we shape our surrounding reality. This type of causal dependence also appears in the concept of action, but there it is not the most basic type of causal dependence. For action, another type of causal dependence is more basic, namely, that which connects conscious human activity with the subject of that activity. Obviously this other type of causal dependence, which has an intransitive character, is accessible in each particular instance only to introspection, to inner experience. This may be why even our linguistic conventions tend to link the concept of action and this basic dimension of it less strongly than is true in reality. In order to get a full sense of the reality of this dimension, we must considerably supplement external experience with internal experience. This dimension, in turn, is of great importance for an insight into the personal subjectivity of the human being.

Once we have a full sense of the reality of the inner dimension of the human being, we see that the efficacy so clearly manifested in the experience of action is not just efficacy but also self-determination. In acting consciously, not only am I the agent of the action and of its transitive and intransitive effects, but I also determine myself. Self-determination is a deeper and more basic dimension of the efficacy of the human self through which the acting human being is revealed as a personal subject. Efficacy alone—the causal dependence of an action on the self—does not tell us the whole story about personal subjectivity. If it did, then this subjectivity could be understood by analogy to other subjects of existence and activity (other supposita) in the world, subjects to which we also attribute efficacy and the effects of this efficacy according to their respective natures and powers. Such efficacy comes from the subject (suppositum), but it does not go back into the subject or return to it somehow, and it does not refer in the first place to the subject itself. It also does not exhibit the unique subjective structure that is revealed by action and by the personal efficacy contained in action. In contrast, the efficacy that is also self-determination fully discloses the person as a subjective structure of self-governance and self-possession. 10

In human activity, or action, I turn toward a variety of ends, objects, and values. In turning toward those ends, objects, and values, however, I cannot help but also in my conscious activity turn toward myself as an end, for I cannot relate to different objects of activity and choose different values without thereby determining myself (thus becoming the primary object for myself as a subject) and my own value. The structure of human action is autoteleological in a special dimension. This is not merely the dimension of biological life and its respective instincts; it is also not merely the dimension of the elementary attraction and repulsion associated with various types of pleasure and pain. The self-determination contained in actions and in authentically human efficacy points to another dimension of autoteleology, one that is ultimately connected with the true and the good—the good in an unconditional and disinterested sense (bonum hones­tum). Human actions thus display a transcendence that is as if another name for the person. This transcendence is what brings to light the sub­jectivity proper to the human being. If this subjectivity is revealed through self-determination, it is because self-determination expresses the transcen­dent dimension of essentially human activity. This dimension stops at the person as a subject and cannot go beyond the person, for it finds its reason of being and its meaning primarily in the person. The efficacy of the person, therefore, ultimately brings to light the subjectivity proper to the person, and it does so every time it is exercised: in every action, choice, and decision, it somehow brings this subjectivity out of the dark and makes it a distinct "phenomenon" of human experience.

Here we are already touching upon other areas of the analysis. As I said before, we cannot do the whole analysis at once, but must develop it gradually and successively. At the same time, however, it is not easy in this analysis to separate the different areas and seal them off hermeti­cally from one another. Before going on, then, let us dwell yet a moment on the structure of efficacy as self-determination. Through it, personal human subjectivity is not only disclosed to us cognitively but is also really constituted as a specific reality, one that is essentially different from all the other supposita we encounter in the surrounding world. This human suppositum, which is constituted and constitutes itself through acts of self-determination, is what we call a self, or an L Of course, we say this primarily and properly of our own suppositum, but indirectly also of every other human suppositum.

I already mentioned earlier that the self is not reducible to conscious­ness alone, although it is constituted through consciousness. Conscious­ness, and especially self-consciousness, is an indispensable condition for the constitution of the human self. Nevertheless, the real constitution of this self within the framework of the human suppositum ultimately takes place as a result of acts of self-determination. In them, as I said before, the structure and profile of the self-possession and self-governance proper to a person are revealed. And they are revealed because in every act of self-determination this structure is somehow realized anew. It is in this realization of the structure of self-determination and self-governance that the person as a concrete human self is actually constituted. This also brings into clearer focus the intimate connection between the self and the suppositum. The self is nothing other than the concrete suppositum humanum, which, when given to itself by consciousness (self-conscious­ness) in the lived experience of action, is identical with the self-possession and self-governance that comes to light as a result of the dynamics of the personal efficacy that is self-determination.

The self, then, is not just self-consciousness, but it is also the self-possession and self-governance proper to a concrete human suppositum. These latter aspects of the self are manifested primarily through action. Earlier I said that the self cannot be reduced to self-consciousness alone; now, however, I should add that the full dimension of the human self, which includes self-possession and self-governance, is conditioned by self-consciousness. This dimension is also the basis of the full relation of the self to the personal subjectivity that is proper to a human being. Such subjectivity, as I said before, is not only the subjectivity of being but also the subjectivity of lived experience. Consciousness plays a fun­damental role in the constitution of such subjectivity through its special function of internalization (in The Acting Person, I called this the reflexive function of consciousness). Thanks to this function, the experience of the human being (primarily as a determinate self) discloses the "inwardness" and "in-selfness" proper to concrete human esse and operari. These are, as I said, meanings of the subject and subjectivity that the concept of suppositum itself does not yet bring to light.

This "inwardness" and "in-selfness," as the full (experienced and lived) realization of the personal subjectivity of the human self, is both manifested and actualized in self-possession and self-governance, for I experience myself as a personal subject to the extent that I become aware that I possess myself and govern myself. The consciousness—or, more precisely, the self-consciousness—connected with action and with efficacy as self-determination conditions that lived experience. In this sense, we can say that both the concrete human self and the concrete personal human subjectivity corresponding to it are constituted though consciousness (with its help).

From the point of view of the person as a being that "exists and acts," the person as a suppositum, I do not see any fundamental flaws or shortcomings in this analysis. After all, the lived experience of our per­sonal subjectivity is simply the full actualization of all that is contained virtually in our metaphysical subjectivity (suppositum humanum). It is also both the full and fundamental revelation of our metaphysical subjec­tivity and the full and fundamental actualization and realization of our being in lived experience. This also seems to be a possible—and in some sense even the philosophically definitive—meaning of the ancient adage operari sequitur esse. The suppositum humanum and the human self are but two poles of one and the same experience of the human being.


The picture of personal human subjectivity that unveils itself before us in experience would be incomplete if we failed to include the element of fulfillment. If action is the avenue to knowledge of the person (operari sequitur esse), then we must necessarily examine the expression "to fulfill an action."" This expression seems in a most basic way to refer not just to the reality of the action, the actus humanus, but also to the reality of the human being, the subject who fulfills the action. This is not an ac­cidental expression. Properly understood, it signifies a tendency away from what is incomplete toward an appropriate fullness. An action as an actus humanus is this actual fullness in the order of operari. The person, however, is always included within the compass of the action's fulfillment. The action as an actus humanus reveals the inwardness and in-selfness of the person and also activates the self-possession and self-governance proper to the structure of the person. In the light of this, we must ask: to what degree is the fulfillment of an action also the fulfillment of oneself, the fulfillment of the person who fulfills the action? 12

This is a very real problem. In some sense, it is even the most profound and basic of all the problems that must be addressed in an analysis of the personal subjectivity of the human being. In the dynamic structure of this subjectivity, the tendency toward the fulfillment of oneself, a tendency that lies at the root of all human operari, particularly actions, testifies simultaneously to contingency and auto teleology. The tendency toward the fulfillment of oneself shows that this self is somehow incomplete, and although the incompleteness and contingency of this being are not synonymous, the former may be reduced to the latter. This same tendency also points to autoteleology, because the aim of this being—a suppositum that experiences itself as incomplete—is the fulfillment of itself: self-ful­fillment. The disclosure of this tendency completes our picture of the human self, which constitutes itself in its actions by means of conscious­ness and self-consciousness. In these actions, through the element of self-determination, the human self is revealed to itself not only as self-possession and self-governance, but also as a tendency toward self-fulfillment. This shows conclusively that the personal subjectivity of the human being is not a closed-in structure. Neither self-consciousness nor self-possession encloses the human self within itself as a subject. Quite the contrary. The whole "turning toward itself" that consciousness and self-consciousness work to bring about is ultimately a source of the most expansive openness of the subject toward reality. In the human being, in the human self as a personal subject, self-fulfillment and transcendence are inseparably connected. I already mentioned earlier that, to the modern mind, transcendence is as if another name for the person.

In philosophy, the term "transcendence" has many meanings. In metaphysics, it signifies being as a reality surpassing all categories, while at the same time constituting their foundation; it also signifies the true and the good as transcendentals on the same level as being. In philosophi­cal anthropology, transcendence—in keeping with its etymology trans­scendere—likewise signifies a surpassing (a going-out-beyond or a rising-above), to the extent that this is verifiable in the comprehensive experience of the human being, to the extent that this is revealed in the dynamic totality of human existence and activity, human esse and operari. The various manifestations of this transcendence ultimately converge in a single source, which constantly resounds within the human being as a subject, as a suppositum, and which in the final analysis testifies that the suppositum humanum is also of a spiritual nature. Transcendence is the spirituality of the human being revealing itself.

I do not intend here to present either a metaphysical analysis of this problem or a comprehensive treatment of the transcendence proper to the human person. I shall confine myself to discussing just one element of transcendence, namely, that which is revealed by the distinctive personal shape given to human actions by conscience. The profile of fulfillment, as strictly belonging to the personal subjectivity of the human being, is connected with this element of transcendence in an especially vivid way. We often speak of moral subjectivity by analogy to psychological subjec­tivity when considering the aspects of consciousness and lived experience, but such distinctions must not be allowed to shatter the image of the basic unity of the personal subject. Personal subjectivity is the subjectivity that we experience as our own self in our own actions. This subjectivity is revealed to us in its true depth in the lived experience of moral value (good or evil), an experience always connected with the element of con­science in human actions.

Why does the element of conscience in action reveal the transcendence of the person? The answer to this question would require a whole series of analyses, which I attempted to carry out in The Acting Person. 13 Here, however, I shall keep my response brief. In conscience, truth presents itself as the source of moral duty, or "categorical" duty (as Kant would say). Truth presents itself as a constitutive condition of the freedom proper to action, in which this freedom manifests itself as the self-determination of the person. To be free means not only to will, but also to choose and to decide, and this already suggests a transcendent subordination of the good to the true in action. Conscience, however, is the proper place of this subordination. The person's authentic transcendence in action is real­ized in conscience, and the actus humanus takes shape as the willing and choosing of a "true good" thanks to conscience. Thus the element of con­science reveals both in action and in the efficient subject of action the transcendence of truth and freedom, for freedom is realized precisely through the willing and choosing of a true good.

"Do good and avoid evil" is the first principle of conscience as synderesis and also the elementary precept of all human praxis. To act in accord with this principle, I must in my conscience constantly go out beyond myself toward true good. This is the basic direction of the transcendence that is a property of the human person (proprium personae). Without this transcen­dence—without going out beyond myself and somehow rising above myself in the direction of truth and in the direction of a good willed and chosen in the light of truth—I as a person, I as a personal subject, in a sense am not myself. Consequently, when we analyze acts of knowledge, acts of will, or the world of values connected with them, we do not bring to light the personal property of the human being unless we bring to light the transcendence that resides in those acts, a transcendence they have by reason of their relation to the true and to the good as "true" (or as "befitting," honestum), i.e., as willed and chosen on the basis of truth.

An analysis of conscience also reveals the strict connection between transcendence and fulfillment. At issue here is not only the role of conscience in the dynamics of fulfilling an action, but also the fulfillment of the self in that action. In fulfilling an action, I fulfill myself in it if the action is "good," which means in accord with my conscience (assum­ing, of course, that this is a good conscience, a true conscience). By acting in this way, I myself become good and am good as a human being. The moral value reaches to the very depths of my ontic structure as a suppositum humanum. The opposite would be an action not in accord with my conscience, a morally evil action. I then become evil and am evil as a human being. In this case, the fulfillment of the action leads not to the fulfillment but to the unfulfillment of myself. The lived experience of the unfulfillment of myself corresponds to a negative moral value (which could also be called an anti-value, especially from the point of view of the judgment and verdict of conscience). Thus fulfillment of self and un­fulfillment of self have two meanings: 1) a metaphysical meaning (I be­come and am good or evil as a human being) and 2) an experiential meaning (which is given in my awareness and lived experience of a moral value—good or evil). These two meanings really deserve a separate analysis, which I do not intend to present here. I wish, however, at least to draw attention to the special proximity of these two meanings. It serves as still another proof that the suppositum humanum and the human self are but two poles of one and the same experience of the human being.

Obviously fulfilling oneself is not identical with fulfilling an action, but depends on the moral value of that action. I fulfill myself not by the fact that I fulfill an action, but by the fact that I become good when that action is morally good. We see, then, that the fulfillment of a person is related to transcendence, to the transcendent dimension of the action, a dimension ob­jectified in conscience. I fulfill myself through good, whereas evil brings me unfulfillment. Obviously, too, self-fulfillment is a distinct structure of the personal subject, a structure that differs from both self-possession and self-determination. This structure is actualized in the action through its moral value through good—of course, only in the dimension of that action per modum actus. The experience of morality also reveals ways in which moral value, good or evil, may become rooted and ingrained in the subject. In this regard, the ethics of Aristotle and later that of Thomas Aquinas, as well as modern-day character studies, speak of habits (de habitibus) and also of moral proficiencies, of virtues and vices. These all involve different forms of the fulfillment or the unfulfillment of the self. Both the one and the other speak of the human being, the human self, as a personal subject.

The essential point in all this is that fulfillment as a subjective reality, a reality given to us in the lived experience of conscience, but clearly not limited to or reducible to that experience, is distinctly connected with transcendence. I fulfill myself, I realize the autoteleology of my personal self, through the transcendent dimension of my operari. The transcendence of truth and goodness has a decisive influence on the formation of the human self, on its development within the whole reality of the personal subject, as an analysis of conscience and morality so clearly reveals. Such an analysis also deepens our view of the contingency of the human being. It does this both by showing how essential it is for us as human beings to strive for self-fulfillment and especially by showing how in this striving we find ourselves always between good and evil, between fulfillment and unfulfillment, and how persistently we must overcome the forces operating both from without and from within against self-fulfillment.

This even partial self-fulfillment brought about by the moral good of an action is accompanied by the element of peace and happiness so es­sential for experiences of conscience (whereas moral evil manifests itself in the experience of conscience accompanied by depression and despair). This suggests that transcendence is in some sense a common perspective for self-fulfillment and happiness. I shall not, however, examine this issue here; I merely wish to draw attention to it.

Omitted: “The Different Dimensions of Community: pp. 236-258

1.  This meeting took place on 16 December 1970 at the Catholic University of Lublin. For a brief account of the discussion, see the opening section of "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination" 187 ff. above. —Trans.
2.  Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Reidel, 1979); originally published in Polish as Osoba i czyn (Krakow: Polskie Tow. Teologiczne, 1969).
3.          Analecta Cracoviensia 5-6 (1973-1974): 49-263. The articles include Andrzej Szostek, "Wprowadzenie" ["Introduction"] 49-51; Karol Wojtyla, "Wypowiedz wstepna w czasie dyskusji nad 'Osoba i czynem' w KUL 16 XII 1970" ["Introductory Remarks at the Discussion of The Acting Person, Catholic University of Lublin, 16 December 1970"] 53-55; Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec, "Ksiaz­ka Kard. Karola Wojtyly monografia osoby jako podmiotu moralnosci" ["Card. Karol Wojtyla's Monograph on the Person as the Subject of Morality"] 57-61; Jerzy Kalinowski, "Metafizyka i fenomenologia osoby ludzkiej. Pytania wywolane przez 'Osobe i czyn"' ["The Metaphysics and Phenomenology of the Human Per­son: Questions Evoked by The Acting Person"] 63-71; Stanislaw Kaminski, "Jak filozofowac o czlowieku?" ["How Does One Philosophize About the Human Being?"] 73-79; Kazimierz Klosak, "Teoria doswiadczenia czlowicka w ujeciu Kard. Karola Wojtyly" ["The Theory of the Experience of the Human Being Ac­cording to Card. Karol Wojtyla"] 81-84; Jozef Tischner, "Metodologiczna strong dziela 'Osoba i czyn"' ["The Methodological Side of The Acting Person"] 85-89; Marian Jaworski, "Koncepcja antropologii filozoficznej w ujeciu Kard. Karola Wojtyly. Proba odczytania w oparciu o studium 'Osoba i czyn"' ["An Attempt to Interpret Card. Karol Wojtyla's Conception of Philosophical Anthropology Based on The Acting Person"] 91-106; Tadeusz Styczen, "Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w 'Osobie i czynie' Kard. Karola Wojtyly" ["The Method of Philosophical Anthropology in Card. Karol Wojtyla's The Acting Person"] 107­115; Roman Forycki, "Antropologia w ujeciu Kard. Karola Wojtyly na podstawie ksiazki 'Osoba i czyn', Krakow 1969" ["The Anthroplogy of Card. Karol Wojtyla, Based on the Book The Acting Person, Krakow 1969"] 117-124; Mieczyslaw Gogacz, "Hermeneutyka 'Osoby i czynu"' ["The Hermeneutics of The Acting Per­son"] 125-138; S. Grygiel, "Hermeneutyka czynu oraz nowt' model swiadomosci" ["A Hermeneutics of Action and a New Model of Consciousness"] 139-151; Antoni B. Stepien, "Fenomenologia tomizujaca w

 ["Phenomenology Made Thomistic in the Book The Acting Person"] 153-157; Andrzej Poltawski, "Czlowiek a swiadomosc w zwiazku z ksiazka Kard. Karola Wojtyly 'Osoba i czyn"' ["The Human Being and Consciousness in Card. Karol Wojtyla's Book The Acting Person"] 159-175; Jerzy Galkowski, "Natura, osoba, wolnosc" ["Nature, Person, and Freedom,"] 177-182; Leszek Kuc, "Uczestnictwo w czlowieczenstwie 'innych'?" ["Participation in the Humanity of 'Others'?"] 183-190; Tadeusz Wojciechowski, "Jednosc duchowo-cielesna czlowieka w ksiazce 'Osoba i czyn"' ["The Spiritual-Physical Unity of the Human Being in the Book The Acting Person"] 191-199; Zofia J. Zdybicka, "Praktyczne aspekty dociekan przedstawionych w dziele 'Osoba i czyn"' ["The Practical Aspects of the Inquiries Presented in the Work The Acting Person"] 201-205; Jerzy Stroba, "Refleksje duszpasterskie" ["Pastoral Reflections"] 207-209; T. Kukolowicz, "'Osoba i czyn' a wychowanie w rodzinie" ["The Acting Person and Education in the Family"] 211-221; W. Poltawski, "Koncepeja samoposiadania—podstawa psychoterapii obiektywizujacej w swietle ksiazki 'Osoba i czyn... ["The Concept of Self-Possession as the Basis for an Objectifying Form of Psychotherapy in Light of the Book The Acting Person"] 223-241; Karol Wojtyla, "Slowo koncowe" ["Concluding Remarks"] 243-263.
4.   See, for example, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination" 187-195 above, as well as "czyn a przezycie" ["Action and Lived Experience"], presented at a symposium on "Phenomenology and Metaphysics" (typescript). See also "The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics" 23-44 above.

5.    See Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec, I—Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropol­ogy, trans. Marie Lescoe, Andrew Woznicki, Theresa Sandok et al. (New Britain: Marcel, 1983). In this work, the self, understood as a subsistent subject, is found in the point of departure and forms the basis of philosophical anthropology. Krapiec gives us an outline of a complete philosophy of the human being. In The Acting Person, on the other hand, I use analyses connected with the ex­perience of the human self as a basis for bringing to light the human being as a person. Still another approach appears, for example, in Jozef Tischner's "Aksjologiczne podstawy doswiadczenia 'ja' jako calosci cielesno-przestrzennej" ["The Axiological Foundations of the Experience of the Self as a Physical-Spatial Whole"] Logos i Ethos: Rozprawy filozoficzne, ed. Marian Jaworski et al. (Krakow: Polskie Tow. Teologiczne, 1971) 33-82. Mieczyslaw Gogacz, one of the participants in the discussion on The Acting Person, presented a paper on the hermeneutics of The Acting Person. He later returned to this theme in a paper presented at an interdisciplinary symposium on "The Hermeneutics of Theological Anthropology," sponsored by the Warsaw Academy of Catholic Theology, 15-16 February 1973 (for the published version of this paper, see "Filozofia czlowieka wobec teologii" ["The Philosophy of the Human Being in Relation to Theology"], Studia Theologica Varsaviensia 12.1 [1974]: 177-192). In addition, Gogacz has published a number of essays in his book Wokol problemu osoby [On the Problem of the Person] (Warsaw, 1974), which also contains the Analecta Cracoviensia paper from the discussion on The Acting Person. Having followed the progression of his thought in these essays, and in the light of what I already said concerning his paper "A Hermeneutics of The Acting Person" in my "Concluding Remarks" to the discussion, I feel a need to reiterate my assessment of Gogacz's position. It seems to me that he has misinterpreted the basic idea in The Acting Person; this is especially evident in his book Wokol problem osoby. In his Studia Theologica Varsaviensia article on my book The Acting Person, we read as fol­lows: "The person is, according to this book, the subject (my emphasis) of theconscious and creative activities, or actions, of the human being, which manifest the person externally" (190). What I actually said in The Acting Person is that the person is principally the agent of action (see Chapter Two, "An Analysis of Efficacy in the Light of Human Dynamism" 60-101).In its basic conception, the whole of The Acting Person is grounded on the premise that operari sequitur esse: the act of personal existence has its direct consequences in the activity of the person (i.e., in action). And so action, in turn, is the basis for disclosing and understanding the person. Without commenting on the schema according to which Gogacz divides theories of the person into exis­tentialistic and essentialistic, I question only—as I did in my "Concluding Remarks" to the discussion—the legitimacy of his interpretation of The Acting Person.
6.   See Chapter Five, "Integration and the Soma," and Chapter Six, "Personal Integration and the Psyche," of Part 111, "The Integration of the Person in Action," The Acting Person 189-258.
7.   See Chapter One, "The Acting Person in the Aspect of Consciousness," The Acting Person 25-59; and Andrzej Poltawski, "czyn a swiadomosc" ["Action and Consciousness"], Logos i Ethos 83.
8.   See Roman Ingarden, Man and Value, trans. Arthur Szylewicz (Washington: Catholic U of America P, 1983).
9.     See Chapter Three, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination," The Acting Person 105-148.
10.  This expression sounds a little awkward in English. We would normally say "to perform an action." In Polish, however, the same verb (spelniac) is used in the phrases "to perform an action" (spelniac czyn) and "to fulfill oneself" (spelniac siebie). spelniac literally means to bring to completion or fullness. Wojtyla here is playing on the similarity of the phrases to bring home his point that when we fulfill (perform) an action we simultaneously fulfill ourselves as well; in other words, two types of fulfillment are going on here. This nuance unfortunately gets lost when spelniac czyn is rendered as "to perform an action," which is how it would normally be translated. —Trans.
11.  See Chapter Four, "Self-Determination and Fulfillment," The Acting Person 149-186.
12.  See Part Two, "The Transcendence of the Person in the Action," The Acting Person 103-186.
13.  See Chapter Seven, "Intersubjectivity by Participation," The Acting Person 261-300.
14.  At the discussion of The Acting Person, Leszek Kuc presented a paper entitled "Participation in the Humanity of 'Others'?" (see also my "Concluding Remarks," in which I comment on this paper). At the moment, however, I am concerned with the view that Kuc represents with regard to the question of person as community, a view he expressed not only in the above paper, but also in "Przyczynek do konstrukcji tematyki antropologii chrzescijanskiej" ["A Contribu­tion to the Construction of the Thematic of Christian Anthropology"], Studio Theologica Varsaviensia 12.1 (1974): 289-302), which he presented at the inter­disciplinary symposium mentioned earlier, and in his article "Zagadnienia antropologii chrzescijanskiej" ["The Questions of Christian Anthropology"], Studio Theologica Varsaviensia 9.2 (1971): 95-109. In these works, Kuc tends more to hint at his position than to present a full account of it. For example, in the Analecta Cracoviensia article we read: "It is precisely here, in this presence of other human beings in the concrete person, that we find the reality, the ontic

                               basis, of community. One can and should, in my opinion, treat every human person
t                              simultaneously as a separate and autonomous person and as a really existing and
I                                   acting community of persons" (187). I would like to add, however, that this in no way removes the need to investigate this community as an objective unity of a real
C                                                           multiplicity of personal subjects. Just as the personal subjectivity of the human being
t is an objective reality, so, too, is—in each given instance—the multiplicity of those subjects and their community or unity through the common good, primarily in relationships of the we type, as will be shown in the course of this analysis.
16. In this sense, we can also speak of that person- community nexus to which Kuc refers in the above mentioned articles.
17. Marian Jaworski, in the essay "Czlowiek a Bog. Zagadnienie relacji zna­czeniowej pomiedzy osoba ludzka i Bogiem a problem ateizmu" ["The Human Being and God: The Question of a Meaningful Relation Between the Human Person and God, and the Problem of Atheism"], Logos i Ethos, writes: "Among the essential elements that distinguish a human person should be included a rela­tion to a thou" (127). This entire article is devoted to the relation of the human
I being (the human I) to God as an unconditional Thou for the human I and as the basis of the human being's personal mode of existence. While taking note of this position, I wish to add that I shall not be analyzing this important relation in the present essay but shall confine my analysis to the area of interhuman relations.
18.1 have dealt with this issue particularly in connection with my work on Max Scheler's ethics; see my Ocena mozliwosci zbudowania etyki chrzescijanskiej przy zalozeniazch systemu Maksa Schelera [An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Principles of Max Scheler's System] (Lublin: Tow. Naukowe KUL, 1959); "System etyczny Maxa Schelera jako srodek do opracowania etyki chrzescijanskiej" ["Max Scheler's Ethical System as a Means of Developing Christian Ethics"], Polonia Sacra 6 (1953-1954): 143-161; "Ewangeliczna zasada nasladowania: Nauka objawienia a system etyczny Maxa Schelera" ["The Evangelical Basis of Imitation: The Teachings of Revelation and Max Scheler's Ethical System"], Ateneum Kaplanski 55 (1957): 57-67.
19.    I discuss the formation of the I-thou relationship in an analytic way in my essay "Participation or Alienation?" 197-207 above.
20.  This principle forms the basis of my ethical study Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (New York: Farrar, 1981), originally published in Polish as Milosc i odpowiedzialnosc (Lublin: Tow. Naukowe KUL, 1960).
21.    See also Gaudium et Spes 12: "But God did not create the human being as a solitaire, for from the beginning 'male and female God created them' (Gen. 1:27), and their union is the primary form of a community of persons (communio personarum)."
22.    See also Gaudium et Spes 24: "When the Lord Jesus prays to the Father 'that all may be we are one' (John 17:21-22), opening inaccessible perspectives to human reason, he reveals that there is a certain likeness between the union of the divine persons and the union of the children of God joined in truth and love."
23.    See especially "Individualism and Anti-Individualism" (271-276) and, for an analysis of attitudes, "'Authentic' Attitudes" (283-287) and "'Nonauthentic' Attitudes" (288-291), in Chapter Seven of The Acting Person.
24.    See on this topic Zbigniew Majchrzyk's study, "Problem alienacji u polskich marksistow" ["The Problem of Alienation According to Polish Marxists"], diss., philosophy, Catholic University of Lublin.

[1] Karol Wojtyla, "Osoba: Podmiot wspolnota," Roczniki Filozoficzne 24.2 (1976): 5-39.