The supreme
philosophic achievement of Karol Wojtyla that characterized the Second Vatican
Council[1]
and his entire pontificate: To account for the unique, unrepeatable “I” as
ontological and irreducible to the objectivized world of “things.”
As such, the “I” has
an inner dynamic distinct from the world of objects, to wit: “man, in only
earthly being God has willed for itself, finds himself by the sincere gift of
himself.
Subjectivity and the
Irreducible in the Human Person
Karol Wojtyla
PERSON AND COMMUNITY
Selected Essays
Translated by Theresa Sandok, OSM
(1993)
Peter Lang
15
15
Subjectivity and the
Irreducible in
the Human Being
1.
2.
3. THE STATE OF THE
QUESTION
The problem of
the subjectivity of the human being seems today to be the
focal point of a variety of concerns. It would be difficult to explain in
just a few words exactly why and how this situation has arisen. No doubt
it owes its emergence to numerous causes, not all of which should be
sought in the realm of philosophy or science. Nevertheless, philosophy—especially
philosophical anthropology and ethics—is a privileged place
when it comes to clarifying and objectifying this problem. And
this is precisely where the heart of the issue lies. Today more
than ever before we feel the need—and also see a greater
possibility—of objectifying the problem of the subjectivity of the
human being.
In this regard, contemporary thought seems to have
more or less set aside the old antinomies that arose primarily in the
area of the theory of knowledge (epistemology) and
that formed an as though inviolable line of demarcation
between the basic orientations in philosophy. The antinomy of
subjectivism vs. objectivism, along with the underlying antinomy of idealism
vs. realism, created conditions that discouraged dealing with human
subjectivity—for fear that this would lead inevitably to subjectivism.
These fears, which existed among thinkers who subscribed to realism
and epistemological objectivism, were in some sense warranted by the subjectivistic
and idealistic character—or at least overtones—of analyses conducted within the realm of "pure consciousness."
This only served to strengthen
the line of demarcation in philosophy and the opposition between the
"objective" view of the human being, which was also an ontological view (the human being as
a being), and the "subjective" view, which seemed inevitably to sever the human being from
this reality.
Today we are seeing a breakdown of that line of demarcation—and for some
of the same reasons that gave rise to it in the first place. By "some of
the same reasons" I mean that this is also happening as a result of
phenomenological analyses conducted in the realm of "pure consciousness"
using Husserl's epoché: bracketing the existence, or reality, of the conscious
subject. I am convinced that the line of demarcation between the subjectivistic
(idealistic) and objectivistic (realistic) views in anthropology and ethics
must break down and is in fact breaking down on the basis of the experience of
the human being. This experience automatically frees us from pure
consciousness as the subject conceived and assumed a priori and leads us to the
full concrete existence of the human being, to the reality of the conscious
subject. With all the phenomenological analyses in the realm of that assumed
subject (pure consciousness) now at our disposal, we can no longer go on
treating the human being exclusively as an objective being, but we must also
somehow treat the human being as a subject in the dimension in which the
specifically human subjectivity of the human being is determined by
consciousness.
And that dimension
would seem to be none other than personal subjectivity.
2. THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION
This matter
requires a fuller examination, in the course of which wemust
consider the question of the irreducible in the human being—thequestion
of that which is original and essentially human, that which accounts for the human
being's complete uniqueness in the world.
Traditional Aristotelian anthropology was based, as we know, on the definition o anthropos zoon noetikon, homo est animal rationale. This definition fulfills Aristotle's requirements for defining the species (human being) through its proximate genus (living being) and the feature that distinguishes the given species in that genus (endowed with reason). At the same time, however, the definition is constructed in such a way that it excludes—when taken simply and directly—the possibility of accentuating the irreducible in the human being. It implies—at least at first glance—a belief in the reducibility of the human being to the world. The reason for maintaining such reducibility has always been the need to understand the human being. This type of understanding could be defined as cosmological.
The usefulness of
the Aristotelian definition is unquestionable. It became
the dominant view in metaphysical anthropology and spawned a variety
of particular sciences, which likewise understood the human being as an animal with
the distinguishing feature of reason. The whole scientific tradition concerning the composition of human
nature, the spiritual-material compositum
humanum—a tradition that came down from the Greeks through the Scholastics to Descartes—moved
within the framework of this definition
and, consequently, within the context of the belief that the essentially human is basically reducible to
the world. It cannot be denied
that vast regions of experience and scientific knowledge based on that
experience reflect this belief and work to confirm it.
On the other
hand, a belief in the primordial uniqueness of the human being,
and thus in the basic irreducibility of the human being to the natural
world, seems just as old as the need for reduction
expressed in Aristotle's definition. This belief stands at the
basis of understanding the human being as
a person, which has an equally long tenure in the
history of philosophy; it also accounts today for the
growing emphasis on the person as a subject and for the
numerous efforts aimed at interpreting the personal subjectivity of the human
being.1
In the
philosophical and scientific tradition that grew out of the definition homo
est animal rationale, the human being was mainly an object, one
of the objects in the world to which the human being visibly and physically
belongs. Objectivity in this sense was connected with the general
assumption of the reducibility of the human being. Subjectivity, on
the other hand, is, as it were, a term proclaiming that the human being's
proper essence cannot be totally reduced to and explained by the
proximate genus and specific difference. Subjectivity
is, then, a kind of synonym for the irreducible in
the human being. If there is an opposition here,
it is not between objectivism and subjectivism, but only
between two philosophical (as well as everyday and practical)
methods of treating the human being: as an object and as
a subject. At the same time, we must not forget that
the subjectivity of the human person is also something objective.2
I should also emphasize that the method of treating
the human being as an object does not result directly from the Aristotelian definition
itself, nor does it belong to the
metaphysical conception of the human being in the Aristotelian tradition. As we
know, the objectivity of the conception of the human being as a being itself required the
postulate that the human being
is 1) a separate suppositum (a subject of existence and action)
and 2) a person(persona). Still,
the traditional view of the human being as a person, which understood the person in terms of the Boethian definition
as rationalis naturae individua substantia, expressed the
individuality of the human being as a
substantial being with a rational (spiritual) nature, rather than the uniqueness of the subjectivity
essential to the human being as
a person. Thus the Boethian definition mainly marked out the "metaphysical terrain"—the dimension of
being—in which personal human
subjectivity is realized, creating, in a sense, a condition for "building
upon" this terrain on the basis of experience.
3. LIVED EXPERIENCE AS AN ELEMENT IN
INTERPRETATION
The category to which we must go in order to do this
"building" seems to be that of
lived experience. This is a category foreign to Aristotle's metaphysics.
The Aristotelian categories that may appear relatively closest to
lived experience—those of agere and pate—cannot be
identified with it. These categories serve to describe the dynamism of a being,
and they also do a good job of differentiating what merely happens in
the human being from what the human being does.3 But
when the dynamic reality of the human being is
interpreted in Aristotelian categories, there is in each case (including
in the case of agere and pate) an aspect not
directly apprehended by such a
metaphysical interpretation or reduction, namely, the aspect of lived experience as the irreducible,
as the element that defies reduction.
From the point of view of the meta-physical structure of being and acting, and thus also from the point of view of
the dynamism of the human being
understood meta-physically, the apprehension of this element may seem unnecessary. Even without it, we obtain
an adequate understanding of the
human being and of the fact that the human being acts and that things happen in the
human being. Such an understanding formed the basis of the entire edifice of anthropology and ethics for many centuries.
But as the need increases to understand the human
being as a unique and unrepeatable person, especially in terms of the whole
dynamism of action and inner happenings proper to the human being—in other
words, as the need increases to understand
the personal subjectivity of the human being—the
category of lived experience takes on greater significance, and, in fact, key significance. For then the issue is
not just the metaphysical objectification
of the human being as an acting subject, as the agent of acts, but the
revelation of the person as a subject experiencing its
acts and inner happenings, and
with them its own subjectivity. From the moment the need to interpret the acting human being (I'home
agissant) is expressed, the
category of lived experience must have a place in anthropology and ethics—and even somehow be at the center of
their respective interpretations.4
One might
immediately ask whether, by giving lived experience such a
key function in the interpretation of the human being as a personal subject,
we are not inevitably condemned to subjectivism. Without
going into a detailed response, I would simply say that,
so long as in this interpretation we maintain a firm enough connection
with the integral experience of the human being, not only are we not
doomed to subjectivism, but we will also safeguard the
authentic personal subjectivity of the human being in the
realistic interpretation of human existence.
4. THE NECESSITY OF PAUSING AT THE IRREDUCIBLE
In order to
interpret the human being in the context of lived experience, the aspect
of consciousness must be introduced into the analysis of
human existence. The human being is then given to us not merely as a being
defined according to species, but as a
concrete self, a self-experiencing subject. Our own subjective being and the existence proper to it
(that of a suppositum) appear to us in experience precisely
as a self-experiencing subject. If we pause here, this being discloses the structures that determine it as a concrete
self. The disclosure of these structures constituting the human
self need in no way signify a break with reduction and the species definition
of the human being—rather, it signifies the
kind of methodological operation that may be described as pausing at the irreducible. We
should pause in the process of reduction, which leads us in the direction of understanding the human being in the
world (a cosmological type of understanding), in order
to understand the human being inwardly. This latter type of understanding may
be called personalistic. The personalistic type of understanding the human being is not the antinomy
of the cosmological type but its complement. As I mentioned
earlier, the definition of the person
formulated by Boethius only marks out the "metaphysical terrain"
for interpreting the personal subjectivity of the human being.
The experience of the human being cannot be derived
by way of cosmological reduction; we must pause at the
irreducible, at that which is unique and
unrepeatable in each human being, by virtue of which he or she
is not just a particular human being—an individual of a
certain species—but a personal subject. Only
then do we get a true and complete picture of the
human being. We cannot complete this picture through reduction
alone; we also cannot remain within the framework of the irreducible
alone (for then we would be unable to get beyond the pure self).
The one must be cognitively supplemented with the other. Nevertheless,
given the variety of circumstances of the real existence of human beings,
we must always leave the greater space in this cognitive effort for the
irreducible; we must, as it were, give the irreducible the upper hand
when thinking about the human being, both in theory and in practice. For
the irreducible also refers to everything in the human being that is invisible
and wholly internal and whereby each human being, myself included,
is an "eyewitness" of his or her own self—of his or her own humanity and person.
My lived experience discloses not only my actions but
also my inner happenings in their profoundest dependence on my own
self. It also discloses my whole personal structure of self-determination, in
which I discover my self as that through which I possess myself
and govern myself—or, at any rate, should possess
myself and govern myself. The dynamic structure
of self-determination reveals to me that I am given to myself and assigned to
myself. This is precisely how I appear to myself in
my acts and in my inner decisions of conscience: as permanently assigned
to myself, as having continually to affirm and monitor myself, and thus, in a
sense, as having continually to "achieve" this dynamic
structure of my self, a structure that is given to me as
self-possession and self-governance. At the same time, this is a completely
internal and totally immanent structure. It is a real
endowment of the personal subject; in a sense, it is this
subject. In my lived experience of self-possession and self-governance, I
experience that I am a person and that I am a subject.
These structures of self-possession and
self-governance, which are essential to every personal self
and shape the personal subjectivity of every human
being, are experienced by each of us in the lived experience of moral
value—good and evil. And perhaps this reality is often revealed to us
more intensely when it is threatened by evil than when—at least for the moment—nothing
threatens it. In any case, experience teaches that the morale is
very deeply rooted in thehumanum, or, more precisely, in what should be
defined as thepersonals. Morality defines the personalistic dimension of the human being in a fundamental way;
it is subjectified in this
dimension and can also be properly understood only in it. At the same time, however, the morale is
a basic expression of the transcendence proper to the personal self. Our decisions of conscience at each step
reveal us as persons who fulfill
ourselves by going beyond ourselves toward values accepted in truth and realized, therefore, with a deep sense of responsibility.
5. A CHALLENGING
PERSPECTIVE
This topic has
been the subject of many penetrating analyses, some already
completed and others ongoing. While not continuing those analyses
here, I wish only to state that, when it comes to understanding the
human being, the whole rich and complex reality of lived experience is not so
much an element or aspect as a dimension in its own right. And this is the
dimension at which we must necessarily pause if the subjective structure—including the subjective personal
structure—of the human being is to be fully delineated.
What does it mean
to pause cognitively at lived experience? This "pausing"
should be understood in relation to the irreducible. The
traditions of philosophical anthropology would have us believe that we can, so
to speak, pass right over this dimension, that we can
cognitively omit it by means of an abstraction that
provides us with a species definition of the human being as a being, or, in
other words, with a cosmological type of reduction (homo = animal
rationale). One might ask, however, whether in
so defining the essence of the human being we do not in a sense leave out what
is most human, since the humanum expresses and realizes
itself as the personals. If so, then the
irreducible would suggest that we cannot come to know and
understand the human being in a reductive way alone. This
is also what the contemporary philosophy of the subject seems to be telling the
traditional philosophy of the object.
But that is not
all. The irreducible signifies that which is essentially incapable
of reduction, that which cannot be reduced but can only be disclosed or revealed.
Lived experience essentially defies reduction. This does not mean,
however, that it eludes our knowledge; it only means that we
must arrive at the knowledge of it differently, namely, by
a method or means of analysis that merely reveals and
discloses its essence. The method
of phenomenological analysis allows us to pause at lived experience as the
irreducible. This method is not just a descriptive cataloging of individual phenomena (in the Kantian sense,
i.e., phenomena as sense-perceptible
contents). When we pause at the lived experience of the irreducible, we attempt to permeate cognitively the
whole essence of this experience. We thus apprehend both the essentially
subjective structure of lived
experience and its structural relation to the subjectivity of the human being. Phenomenological analysis thus
contributes to trans-phenomenal
understanding; it also contributes to a disclosure of the richness proper to human existence in the whole
complex compositum humanum.
Such a disclosure—the deepest possible
disclosure—would seem to be an indispensable means for
coming to know the human being as a personal subject.
At the same time, this personal human subjectivity is a determinate reality: it
is a reality when we strive to understand it within the objective
totality that goes by the name human being. The
same applies to the whole character of this method of
understanding. After all, lived experience is
also—and above all—a reality. A legitimate method of disclosing
this reality can only enrich and deepen the whole realism of the conception
of the human being. The personal profile of the human being then
enters the sphere of cognitive vision, and the composition of human nature,
far from being blurred, is even more distinctly accentuated. The thinker
seeking the ultimate philosophical truth about the human being no longer moves
in a "purely metaphysical terrain," but finds elements in
abundance testifying to both the materiality and the spirituality of the human
being, elements that bring both of these aspects into sharper relief. These
elements then form the building blocks for further philosophical construction.
But certain questions always remain: Are these two
types of understanding the human being—the cosmological and the personalistic—ultimately
mutually exclusive? Where, if at all, do
reduction and the disclosure of the irreducible in the human being converge? How is the philosophy
of the subject to disclose the objectivity of
the human being in the personal subjectivity of this being?
These seem to be the questions that today determine the perspective for thinking about the human being, the perspective for contemporary anthropology and ethics. They are
essential and burning questions.
Anthropology and ethics must be pursued today within this challenging
but promising perspective.
NOTES
1. One such effort is my
book Osoba i czyn [Person and Action] (Krakow: Polskie Tow. Teologiczne,
1969; rev. ed. 1985). [English edition: The Acting Person, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston:
Reidel, 1979).] Another even more
relevant work in this regard is my essay "The Person: Subject and
Community" 219-261 below.
2. See the section entitled
"Subjectivity and Subjectivism" in The Acting Person 56-59.
3. My work The Acting Person is in
large measure constructed upon this basis.
4. One can observe this by
comparing my book The Acting Person with Mieczyslaw A. Krapiec's
book I—Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology, trans. Marie Lescoe,
Andrew Woznicki, Theresa Sandok et al. (New Britain: Mariel, 1983).
Karol WoJtyla, "Podmiotowosci I 'to, co nieredukowalne' w
eflowieku,"Ethos 1.2-3 (1988):
21-28. A paper sent to
an international conference in Paris (13-14 June 1975).
Posted by Rev. Robert A. Connor at 10:43 AM
[1] “If
we study the Conciliar magisterium as a whole, we find that the Pastors of the
Church were not so much concerned to answer questions like ‘What should men
believe?’, ‘What is the real meaning of this or that truth of faith’ and so on,
but rather to answer the more complex question: ‘What does it mean to be a
believer [subject], a Catholic and a member of the Church;” Sources
of Renewal, Harper and Row (1979) 17.
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